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SOME RECENT LABOR CASES: 1941-1947
ROBERT

L. Howmw*

During the period covered by this survey one case in every five reaching
the Supreme Court of the United States has involved problems of labor, while
the proportion of labor cases in many of the state courts and the lower federal
courts has been almost equally great. It is, therefore, possible to deal with
only a selected group of cases in any such brief survey as here undertaken1
With the exception of the cases involving freedom of speech and press
and arising under the application of the principles of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to state action, most of the cases of importance have arisen
under the provisions of some federal labor legislation and will be so classified.
I.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

A. Freedom of Speech and Press for the Employee
Any consideration of the problem of freedom of speech and press as it
affects the employee or his representatives in labor controversies necessarily
presupposes familiarity with the basic doctrine set forth by cases like Thorn8
to the effect that picketing by emhill v. Alabama2 and Carlsonv. California
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, A.B. Univers'ty of Missouri 1917,
A.M. 1918, LL.B. 1925, S.J.D. Harvard 1933.
1. A substantial nucleus of the material contained in this article was first
collected for use in an oral discussion as part of a Short Course in Industrial Personnel Problems for Industrial Personnel Managers presented by the Division of
Adult Education of the University of Missouri in March of 1947. Additional cases,
undertaking to list the highlights in the United States Supreme Court from the
beginning of its 1941 Term to the end of its 1946 Term on June 23, 1947, with a
few outstanding state and lower federal court decisions, are now included and the
whole presented here, not as a finished product of exhaustive research but rather
as a survey of leading cases in something of the nature of the so-called refresher
materials that may be useful to some of the younger lawyers in bridging the gap
made by the war years in keeping abreast of developments in tlis rapidly changing
field of the law. No attempt has been made to comment on all Supreme Court
cases dealing with labor,'but the more significant cases are briefly discussed.
This article was substantially completed before the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 became law and no attempt is here made to discuss that Act. A
later article will undertake that task. Occasional references have been added calling
attention to provisions of the Act that deal directly with matters here under discussion on the basis of the cases. References are made merely to the 1947 Act.
2. 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup Ct. 736 (1940).
3. 310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).
(235)
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ployees or a labor organization as a means of giving publicity to the facts
involved in a labor dispute within the area of free discussion guaranteed by
the First Amendment to the Constitution against national action, and as
read into the liberty provision of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment for protection against state action. "Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to
us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society,"4 said
the Court in the ThornLill case, and picketing with placards proclaiming the
facts or issues was held to be protected as a part of that process.
Two other background cases, both of which were decided during the
1940 term of the Supreme Court, should be mentioned. In denying validity
to a very broad injunction granted by a state court and enjoining a wide
area of union activity ranging from peaceful persuasion to acts of violence,
the Supreme Court in American Federationof Labor v. Swing' denied that
the non-existence of a dispute between an employer and his employees made
peaceful picketing a proper subject for restraint. "Such a ban on free communication," said the court, "is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom
A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercisof speech ....
ing the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an emThe right of free communiployer and those directly employed by him ....
cation cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute
with an employer, even though they are not in his employ."" That the protections thrown around labor activity by these cases was subject to some
very considerable limitations was first made clear by the case of Milk
Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,Inc.,7
decided the same day as the Swing case. The Court here not only gave recognition to the lee-way for injunction to restrain violence, intimidation,
and coercion involved in picketing, but sustained the validity of a state restraining order preventing future peaceful picketing on the basis of what
the majority found to be such a background of past violence as would carry
over into future peaceful picketing and give to it a flavor of intimidation.
A vigorous, well reasoned and exhaustive dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice
4.
5.
6.
7.

310 U. S. 88, 103.
312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568 (1941).
312 U. S. 321, 325, 326.
312 U.S. 287, 61 Sup. Ct. 552 (1941).
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Black, along with the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, furnishes
a wealth of material for careful study of this problem.
If the majority opinion in the Meadown:oor case provides the first express limitation upon the doctrine here under consideration, the case of
Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe8
carried the limitation further. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of the Swing case,
and has been generally regarded as restricting materially the applicable
scope of the doctrine of the Thornhiill and Carlson cases. By a 5 to 4 decision the Supreme Court sustained an injunction, under the Texas anti-trust
statute, restraining peaceful picketing of a cafe owned by Ritter due to the
employment of non-union carpenters and painters in the erection of a new
building which Ritter was having built in the same city but at some distance from the cafe. Admitting that such peaceful picketing, if it had been
carried on at the scene of the new building, in connection with the erection
of which the dispute arose, would have been fully protected by the doctrine
of the Thornhill case, Mr. Jusice Frankfurter asserted that such protection
may properly be restricted to the scene of the dispute and the industry out
of which it arose. Since there was no dispute beween Ritter and his cafe
employees concerning the operation of the cafe, peaceful picketing in that
vicinity may properly be restrained. A contrary view, it is asserted, "would
compel the states to allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode
to conscript neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or the industry
in which it arose" '9
Both Justice Black and Justice Reed wrote vigorous dissenting opinions, with Justices Douglas and Murphy joining with the former. The dissents pointed out that the purpose of the injunction was to protect from injury the cafe business of Ritter who was a party to the dispute, and to uphold it was greatly to circumscribe the doctrine of the Thornhill case.
While the Swing case purpoted to make it clear that the protection of peaceful picketing is not to be restricted to the case of an employer and his own
employees, the Ritter's Cafe case excluded from that protection those not
employed in the same industry, and applied this new doctrine to a case of
an employer against whom the picketing was otherwise properly directed,
because such picketing was directed to his other business establishment

8.

315 U. S. 722, 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (1942).

9. 315 U. S. 722, 728.
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which, incidentally, happened to be the only place where the picketing
could be calculated to be effective.
In Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl,' 0 decided the same day as the Ritter's
Cafe case, was involved a case where independent peddlers bought baked
products from bakeries and sold to retailers in competition with the distribution of bakery products through the union employees. Said peddlers
worked seven days a week and refused to join the union which was attempting by collective bargaining to secure better wages, hours, and conditions of labor for the drivers. The Supreme Court unanimously set aside
an injunction granted by a state court restraining the drivers from peaceful
picketing of the bakeries and retailers with whom the peddlers did business.
The Court admitted that "a state is not required to olerate in all places and
all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual,"" but found it
was practically impossible for the drivers to make known their legitimate
grievances to the public whose patronage was sustaining the peddler system
except by the means here employed. To the position taken by the state
court that since there did not exist a labor dispute as defined by the New
York statute the legality of the injunction followed automatically, the Supreme Court replied that "one need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by
state law to have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to express a
grievance in a labor matter by publication unattended by violence, coercion,
or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive.""2
In Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos'8 petitioners had been enjoined by a New York court from picketing respondents' cafeteria. The alleged purpose of the picketing was to organize the cafeteria, though it was
operated by its owner without the aid of employees." s Signs carried by the
pickets were calculated to give the impression that the pickets had been
employees in the cafeteria and that the owner was unfair to organized labor.
Also reference was made to patronizing the place beng the equivalent of
"aiding the cause of Fascism." The Supreme Court, in setting aside the injunction said "to use loose language ... like 'unfair' or 'fascict' . . . is not to
falsify facts," and reiterated the doctrine of the famous Swing case to the
effect that "a state cannot exclude workingmen in a particular industry
10. 315 U. S.769, 62 Sup. Ct. 816 (1942).
11. 315 U. S. 769, 775.
12. Id. at 774.
13. 320 U. S.293, 64 Sup. Ct. 126 (1943).
13a. See Sec. 8(b) (4)B of 1947 Act.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss3/1
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from putting their case to the public in a peaceful way 'by drawing the circle
of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him'." Thus the
fact that the pickets were not and never had been employees of the owner
of the enterprise being picketed was a matter of no consequence.
Commenting on the famous Meadowmoor Dairies case which sustained

an injunction against picketing because it was thought to be permeated
throughout with violence and coercion, although all alleged acts of violence
had occurred sometime earlier, and noting that the right of free speech in
the form of future picketing cannot be forfeited because of dissociated and

sporadic acts of past violence, the Court said, "still less can the right to
picket ... be taken away merely because there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of violence occurring in the course of that
' 4

pickting."'
Recognition of the right to enjoin violence in connection with picketing
was made clear by the Supreme Court in the case of Hotel and Restaurant
Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board" in which an order of the State Employment Relations Board restraining picketing was upheld on the ground that all that was done by the
order and the State Employment Peace Act on which the order was based,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, was to forbid and restrain violence
while peaceful picketing was unmolested. Thus there was no interference
with constitutional rights of free speech and press safeguarded by the doctrine of the Thornhil case.
In a somewhat similar case decided the same day and involving an
order of the same Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, under authorization of the same Wistonsin Employment Peace Act, forbidding a union
and its members, in connection with a labor dispute, to engage in mass picketing, picketing employees' homes, threatening employees, and obstructing
entrance to employer's factory, the Court held that the state order was not
void as in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act and asserted that
the federal act did not so far occupy the field as to preclude the states from
passing police measures supplementing the federal regulation. This case,
Allen-Bradley Local No. iiii, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,16 did not deal
14. 320 U. S. 293, 296.
15. 315 U. S. 437, 62 Sup. Ct. 706 (1942).
16. 315 U. S. 740, 62 Sup. Ct. 820 (1942).
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directly with freedom of speech, but was decided solely on the basis of the
commerce power and conflict with a federal statue, but is mentioned here
for the purposes of comparison, since the opinion of the Court, though silent
on the matter of applying the First Amendment, would seem to make it
quite clear that such activities as there restrained do not enjoy any constitutional protection.
One of the most important of the cases involving labor and the First
Amendment, though not concerned with picketing or the immediate relations of employer and employee, is that of Thomas v. Collins,' involving' a
statute of Texas regulating labor unions and, among other things, requiring
every "labor union organizer" to present his name, union affiliation and
credentials to the Secretary of State and secure an "organizer's card" before
soliciting members for his organization. "Labor union organizer" was defined by the statute as a person "who for a pecuniary or financial consideration solicits . . . members for a labor union," and, as interpreted by the
Secretary of State, "solicitation of memberships as an incident to other
duties for which a salary is paid" would bring one within the requirements
of the statute. No fee was required and the card was to be issued upon
application.
R. J. Thomas, then President of the United Automobile Workers and
Vice-President of the C.I.O., was scheduled to go to Texas and make a
speech in a drive for union membership in connection with a campaign preceding an election for bargaining representative held under the auspices of
the National Labor Relations Board.
An order was issued ex parte by a Texas court restraining Thomas,
while in Texas, from soliciting members for specified unions and others affiliated with the C.I.O., without first obtaining an organizer's card. Thomas
delivered his scheduled address and at the close thereof asked persons present to join the Union and named one individually specially in the invitation.
For this he was held in contempt, fined and sentenced to a short jail term.
The Supreme Court by a division of 5 to 4 held that the rights of free
speech and free assembly under the First Amendment had been invaded.
In doing so it was pointed out that Thomas went to Texas for the sole purpose of making the speech, the whole object of which "was publicly to proclaim the advantages of workers' organization and to persuade workmen ta
join Local No. 1002 as part of a campaign for members," and that these
17. 323 U. S. 516, 65 Sup. Ct. 315 (1945).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss3/1
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were the "sole objects of the meeting," and that it was not possible to draw
a line between the making of such a speech and solicitation of members,
since the statute would forbid "any language which conveys, or reasonably
could be found to convey, the meaning of invitation." Then, said the Court,
"the restriction's effect... in a very practical sense was to prohibit Thomas
not only to solicit members and merberships, but also to speak in advocacy
of the cause of trade unionism in Texas, without having first procured the
card." 8
Finally, the Court asserted that "when legislation or its application can
confine labor leaders on such occasions to innocuous and abstract discussion
of the virtues of trade unions and so becloud even this with doubt, uncertainty and the risk of penalty (since it might be construed as solicitation),
freedom of speech for them will be at an end .... We think a requirement
that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment."' 9
Four Justices in dissent thought the application of the statute should
be narrowly restricted to working merely as a solicitor for a remuneration,
and since the requirement was only one of registration for identification
purposes and no discretion to withhold the card rested with the Secretary
of State, no invasion of rights under the First Amendment was involved.
For purposes of comparison with the Thomas case might be mentioned
that of Hill v. Florida"° which held invalid, solely as being in conflict with
the National Labor Relations Act guaranteeing freedom in the selection of
representatives for collective bargaining, a Florida statute requiring business agents of labor unions to pay $1.00 for an annual license, to be withheld from one who has not been a citizen for ten years, or has been convicted
of a felony or is not of good moral character, to be granted or denied by a
board, apparently in the exercise of its sound judgment, after a thirty day
period in which objections may be filed to the issuance of such a license.
Also the statute required the union to pay a like fee and file certain reports.
B. Freedom of Speech, and Press for the Employer
Much has been and is being said and written about employer free
speech and the need for legislation to give to the employer a freedom of
expression comparable to that enjoyed by the employee or his representa18. 323 U. S. 516, 536.
19. Id. at 540.
20. 325 U. S. 538, 65 Sup. Ct. 1373 (1945).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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tive. The problem arises because of the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of
the National Labor Relations Act protecting the employee from unfair labor
practices by the employer and the fact that coercion by the employer in
regard to employees organizing and choosing collective bargaining representatives is often exerted by statements as well as by acts. With the employer having the power to discharge or otherwise use his economic force
to the disadvantage of employees, his statements that would otherwise be
protected may well have a coercive effect against which the Act of Congress
is calculated to provide protection.
While the problem thus involved primarily grows out of the application of the National Labor Relations Act, the cases applicable to it are discussed here because of the relation of this problem to that of employee freedom of speech discussed above.
The leading case on this problem, yet one that is very difficult properly
to interpret and apply, is that of National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co. 2 1 decided in the 1941 term of the Supreme Court. The
element of communication giving rise to the free speech controversy in this
case was set in a background of other activity calculated to give rise to a
finding of anti-union or unfair labor practices. The principal facts found by
the National Labor Relations Board and dealt with by the Court were that
the company was and had been hostile to labor organizations, had posted a
bulletin appealing to its employees to bargain with it without the intervention of an outside union, and had directed its employees to select representatives to attend meetings at which company officials would speak on
the Wagner Act. At such meetings two high company officials read identical speeches which urged the employees to set up their own bargaining organization. Application cards for membership in the proposed Independent
union were distributed throughout the company's plants and many were
signed on company property and on company time. Within the space of a
very few weeks, the organization of the Independent was completed, a contract was executed providing for a closed shop, check-off, and a wage increase. The company paid to the Independent $3000.00 before it had time
to collect it by way of the check-off, and discharged employees refusing to
join the Independent.
The board found that the company had engaged in unfair labor practices, that the Independent was company-dominated, and that the posted
21. 314 U. S. 469, 62 Sup. Ct. 344 (1941).
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bulletin and the speeches had the effect of interfering with, restraining and
coercing the employees in the exercise of their right of self organization
under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. This latter finding
was charged by the company to be violative of its right to free speech
under the First Amendment.
/
In dealing with this aspect of the case, Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking
for the Court, said,
"Neither the Act nor the Board's order here enjoins the employer
from expressing its view on labor policies or problems, nor is a penalty imposed upon it because of any utterances which it has made.
The sanctions of the Act are imposed not in punishment of the em-ployer but for the protection of the employees. The employer in
this case is as free now as ever to take any side it may choose on
this controversial issue. But certainly conduct, though evidenced
in part by speech, may amount in connection with other circumstances to coercion within the meaning of the Act. If the total activities of an employer restrain or coerce his employees in their
free choice, then those employees are entitled to the protection of
the Act. And in determining whether a course of conduct amounts
to restraint or coercion, pressure exerted vocally by the employer
may no more be disregarded than pressure exerted in other ways.
For 'Slight suggestions to the employer's choice between unions
may have telling effect among men who know the consequence of
incurring that employer's strong displeasure.' International Association of Machinists v. National Labor Relations Board, 311
U.S. 72, 78, 61 Sup. Ct. 83, 87, 88, 85 L.Ed. 50.
"If the Board's order here may fairly be said to be based on the
totality of the Company's activities during the period in question,
we may not consider the findings of the Board as to the coercive
effect of the bulletin and the speeches in isolation from the findings as respects the other conduct of the Company. If the Board's
ultimate conclusion is based upon a complex of activities, such as
the anti-union background of the Company, the activities of
Bishop, Edwards' warning to the employees that they would be
discharged for 'messing with the C.I.O.,' the discharge of Mann,
the quick formation of the Independent and the part which the
management may have played in that formation, that conclusion
would not be vitiated by the fact that the Board considered what
the Company said in conjunction with what it did. The mere fact
that language merges into a course of conduct does not put that
whole course without the range of otherwise applicable administrative power. In determining whether the Company actually interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees the Board has

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947
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a right to look at what the Company has said as well as what it
22
has done."
WithoUt indicating clearly that these utterances, if taken alone, weie
to be protected by the First Amendment, though perhaps intimating 'as
much, and because it was not clear that the board's order has been based
on the totality of the company's conduct of which these utterances were a
part, rather than upon the utterances themselves, the Court sent the case
back for redetermination by the board. A second order by the b6ard was
held by the circuit court of appeals to have been based on the "totality of
the company's activities," and when the case returned to the Supreme Court
in 1943 the freedom of speech issue was not presented, and the Court has
not squarely dealt with that issue since, further than to deny certiorariin
some cases where the issue had been raised below.
Thus the matter is far from being clarified, but the doctrine of the
Virginia Electric case has done much to help guide the development in this
field. Clear it is that coercive acts amounting to unfair labor practices
within the prohibition of the National Labor Relations Act may include
in their "totality" statements calculated to have a coercive effect. Whether
such statements standing alone would be protected by the First Amendment is not wholly clear. Judge Learned Hand in NationalLabor Relations
Board v. American Tube Bending Company2" has suggested that perhaps
the Virginia Electric case should be interpreted to mean that such protection should exist, though in the case he was deciding there were no other
coercive circumstances and the utterances standing alone were not considered
sufficiently coercive to sustain a board order, even if the constitutional protection were regarded as not being applicable.
Prior to the time of the Virginia Electric case, the board had held that
the making of threats to discharge workers if they joined a union, or to
withhold raises or promotions, or to close the plant if a union were voted
in, were, by virtue of the economic power of the employer to carry out such
threats, unfair labor practices within the condemnation of the Act. There
is probably little disposition to quarrel with such a conclusion today.
Very recently an industry attorney writing on the subject of employer
freedom of speech suggested, "if coercion is implicit in the words used or
if the obvious meaning of the words is a threat to exercise superior eco22. 314 U. S. 469, 477, 478.
23. 134 F. (2d) 993 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) Cert. denied 320 U. S. 768, 1943).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss3/1
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nomic power with intent thereby to override the rights of employees, words
of an employer, whether oral or written, are coercive per se 'and therefore
unfair labor practice, '' 24 which clearly the prohibitions of the act should
apply to. There is seldom, of course, a coercive statement that is not set
in a totality of conduct, coercive or otherwise, all of which should be carefully considered in determining whether it properly can be brought within
the statutory prohibition .
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Jacksonville Paper
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board in enforcing a board order because
of other acts had this to say:
"The Act does not take away the employer's right to freedom
of speech ....

We take it that an employer has the right to express

his hostility to the Union if he has any. He has a right to express
his opinion of the leaders of the Union, be that opinion good or
bad. He is not precluded by the Act from inquiring or being informed as to the progress of the efforts at unionization. He has a
right to inquire if the Union was organized or if it has 'washed up,'
but the employer cannot under the Act use that constitutional
right of freedom of speech threateningly or coercively, and especially when he has within himself the power to enforce his threats.' ' 25
In the case of National Labor Relations Board v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, purporting to adhere to the Virginia
Electric case, asserted that "If respondent used coercive language it may
be held responsible in these proceedings notwithstanding the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. .
straint or coercion ....

.

. The sole statutory test is interference, re-

It is here urged by the Board that the repetition

and vehemence of statement by the officers of respondent rendered such
statements coercive but we think the right of free speech and the exercise
of that right cannot rest on so fragile support. So long as the reasoning
power of the employee and not his fear is appealed to, the Constitution proteCtS.112G

More recently the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals again, speaking
through Judge Gardner in National Labor Relations Board v. KopmanWoracek Shoe Mfg. Co., a case arising in Flat River, Missouri, emphasized
the freedom of expression for the employer, short of threats and coercion.
24. Morgan, Employer's Freedom of Speech and the Wagner Act (1946) 20
469, 498.
25. 137 F. (2d) 148, 152 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) (Cert. denied 320 U. S. 772,
1943).
26. 145 F. (2d) 556, 566 (C.C.A. 8th', 1944).

TULANE L. REV.
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"The employer has the undoubted right," runs the opinion, "to express his
opinion on the merits of labor organization controversies and the right to
indicate his preference for individual dealings with employees. . . .While
the employer may attempt to persuade his employees with respect to joining or not joining a union, he may not, however, indulge this right to the
extent of coercion or threats of reprisal.127 A circular letter sent by the
employer to all employees in their pay envelopes and apparently arguing
against the need for a union (contents not set out by court) was assumed
by the court to be, standing by itself, within the guaranty of the First
Amendment. However, admonitions by the foreman and supervisors that
conditions would be worse if the union came in, "if the union gets in maybe
you will not have to work at all ...we will all be walking the streets,"
were said by the court to amount to threats that the plant would close down
and the employees would be out of work if the union was brought in, and
viewed in the light of all the facts and circumstances-the totality of the
company conduct--"were not mere expressions of personal opinion, but
were threats and appeals to the employees' fear that they would lose their
jobs if they should organize the union, '' 28 and constituted an unfair labor
practice.
Without further clarification by the Supreme Court, it is not easy to
speak with assurance as to the exact extent or limits of employer free speech,
but on the basis of a survey of board and lower court action since the decision of the Virginia Electric case, it seems proper to agree with the representative of management writing in the Tidane Law Review, when he says:
"It would now seem quite clear that, under the law in 1946, if an
employer avoid acts of coercion, domination discrimination and restraint apart from his oral or written speech; if he avoids threats,actual or implied, of those types of future action on his part; if he sees
that his supervisors and any others who might be acting for him do
likewise; if he states the right of self-organization clearly and unequivocally, and promises that there will be no reprisals if it is exercised; and if he confines himself to the truth, without passion or
prejudice, or to clear statements of his opinion; he can say almost
27. 158 F. (2d) 103, 104, 105 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946) (Rehearing denied Jan. 2,
1947).
28. Id. at 105. For a somewhat similar case in which statements by the employer were held to be protected since "there is no evidence which could reasonably
be said to give to Barr's remarks the import of a covert threat," see National Labor
Relations Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. (2d), 486, 500 (C.C.A. 8th,
1946).
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anything he chooses about the unions or union leaders and can
advise his employees, either generally or in specific detail."-9
While his matter is being dealt with by provisions in proposed legislation now pending before Congress, it is entirely possible that unimpeded
judicial interpretation and application might more effectively develop a
satisfactory status for employer freedom of expression, consistent with the
purposes of the National Relations Act to protect employees from coercion,
29a
than is likely to emerge from action by Congress.
II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT
A great many cases involving charges of unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, other than those dealt with
above under the heading of free speech, have been before the courts during
the period here under consideration, but only the more important of those
before the Supreme Court will be mentioned.
A. Phohibition of Union Solicitation on Premises of the Employer
The not unusual practice of forbidding union solicitation upon the
premises of the employer came before the Court in Republic Aviation Colporaton v. National Labor Relations Board,30 and the Court upheld the
validity of the board's determination that such a general prohibition by a
company against soliciting on the premises "in so far as it prohibits union
activity and solicitation on company property during the employees' own
time" is an invalid rule as an unreasonable interference with the right of
self-organization, and that the discharge of employees for violation of the
rule constituted an unfair labor practice, although it was admitted that the
rule was a general one applicable to all types of solicitation and that there
had been no bias or discrimination by the company in enforcing the rule.
A similar board ruling was more recently upheld by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in May Dept. Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board.31
B. Refusal to Bargain: Contracts with Individual Employees
One of the significant cases in the 1943 Supreme Court term is that of
J.I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board32 where an employer was
charged with having refused to bargain with a certified union, his alleged
29. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 24 at 520.
29a. See Section 8(c) of the 1947 Act.
30. 324 U. S. 793, 65 Sup. Ct. 982 (1945).
31. 154 F. (2d) 553 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946) (Cert. denied 67 Sup. Ct. 72, 1946).
32. 321 U. S. 332, 64 Sup. Ct. 576 (1944).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1947

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1947], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 12

justification being that at a time when the union did not represent a majority of the workers he had entered into individual one-year contracts
with approximately 75% of the employees and those contracts had not yet
expired.
In speaking for the Court and upholding the board's order to bargain
with the certified union as to wages and hours, Mr. Justice Jackson emphasized that a collective labor agreement does not preclude the use of individual contracts of employment, but that the collective agreement serves
to fix the terms of employment which control the individual hirings and
that such individual contracts, which are subsidiary, may not run contrary
to the provisions of the collective agreement any more than an individual
shipper can contract away benefits secured by the filed tariffs of a railroad,
or a utility customer the benefits of legally established rates. Thus each
employee, though he might have yielded to less favorable terms in an individually bargained contract, is not permitted to waive any of the benefits
of the trade agreement; and to allow the employer to enforce the less favorable terms of the individual contracts would be contrary to the purpose of
the National Labor Relations Act which is "to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and
bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group."3 13 To the suggestion
that this may well work to the injury of the more highly skilled employees
who might be in a position to make especially advantageous individual contracts for themselves, Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out that "the practice
and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with suspicion on such individual advantages." 4 Except as to areas left open for individual bargaining by the terms of the collective agreement, "advantages to individuals
may prove as disruptive of industrial peace as disadvantages. They are a
fruitful way of interfering with organization and choice of representatives;
increased compensation, if individually deserved, is often earned at the cost
of breaking down some other standard thought to be for the welfare of the
group, and always creates the suspicion of being paid at the long range expense of the group as a whole.... The workman is free, if he values his own
bargaining position more than that of the group, to vote against representation; but the majority rules and if it collecticizes the employment bargain,
individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution to the collective result. "'3
33. 321 U.'S. 332, 338.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 339.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss3/1
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This, it is to be noted, is to be true whether the individual who might
secure a better contract for himself may have voted for or against representation. This conclusion appears to be amply supported by the language of
the statute in Section 9(a) providing that representatives selected by the
majority shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for collective bargaining, with the proviso that "any individual employee or group of employees shall have he right at any time to present
grievances to their employer."
The result of this case would seem to make it clear that aside from presenting grievances, the individual employee who may have opposed the
selection of the union designated by the majority as its bargaining representative, is permitted to deal with his employer only through the agency
of that bargaining representative selected by the majority. This would seem
to be a repudiation of the dictum contained in the opinion in the Jones &
3
case, which originally upheld the constitutional validity of the
LaugldinP
National Labor Relations Act, to the effect that the right of the employer
to make individual contracts with individual employees was not destroyed.
Whether this case is also in effect a repudiation of the Carter Coal
Company37 case of 1936, invalidating the Guffey Coal Act which made wage
agreements with a majority of the coal producers binding upon the whole
industry, it is hardly necessary to inquire.
Another case decided by the Supreme Court in the same year, Medo
Photo Supply Corp v. National Labor Relations Board,'8 gave further
meaning to these same provisions of the statute. Where the majority of
the employees in a single department of the Medo Corporation had designated a union as their bargaining agent and while bargaining negotiations
were apparently in progress the corporation induced the employees to abanden the union by granting a wage increase, which action was held to be unlawful on two grounds. In the first place, negotiating with the individual
employees to ascertain their willingness to withdraw from the union in return for a wage increase amounted to an interference with the exclusive
bargaining rights of the union as emphasized by the J. L Case Co. decision; and in the second place, what is closely allied to the first, the promise
of increased wages to induce the employees to withdraw from the union
constituted an unlawful interference with the right of collective bergaining.
36. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,
301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
37. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936).
38. 321 U. S. 678, 64 Sup. Ct. 830 (1944).
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Somewhat the same problem was more recently involved in the Famous Barr case in St. Louis, May Department Stores Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board,89 where an employer sought authority of the War Labor
Board for a general wage increase applicable to some 5000 employees, including a small group for whom a bargaining representative had been certified by the National Labor Relations Board, without taking the matter
up with that certified bargaining agent, which action was publicly announced to its employees. This was held to be an unfair labor practice
under Section 8(1) of the Wagner Act. The company had refused to recognize the certified union and sought to preserve its opportunity to test the
validity of the certification in the courts.
In holding the company's action to be an unfair labor practice the Supreme Court said: "Employer action to bring about changes in wage scales
without consultation, and negotiation with the certified representative of
its employees cannot .

.

. be distinguished from bargaining with individuals

or minorities"40 as involved in the Case and Medo cases. "Such unilateral
action minimizes the influence of organized labor. It interferes with the
right of self organization by emphasizing to the employees that there is no
necessity for a collective bargaining agent."14' The Court further pointed
out that there was no basis for eliminating from consideration the announcements or publication of the employer's action to the employees on any
ground that they were an exercise of the right of free expression or free
speech secured by the First Amendment, but were properly regarded as a
part of the "totality" of company activities within the doctrine of the
Virginia Electric case.
C. Employee Status and the Proper Bargaining Unit
The case of Packard Motor Car Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board42 brought before the Supreme Court the somewhat vexed question of
the legality under the statute of foremen's unions on which the board had
vacillated a bit in the past. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 43 had sustained a ruling of the board to the effect that foremen are employees within
the meaning of those provisions of Sections 2, 7, 8 and 9 of the Act defining
employees and guaranteeing the rights of self-organization and the choice
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

326 U. S. 376, 66 Sup. Ct. 203 (1945).
326 U. S. 376, 384.
Id. at 385.
67 Sup. Ct. 789 (1947).
157 F. (2d) 80 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946).
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of representatives for collective bargaining, and are therefore an appropriate
unit for collective bargaining purposes. This decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for five members of the Court, restricted
the judicial function to a determination of whether the board, acting under
the statute, had authority to make the order and whether there was evidence to support it. He felt that Section 2 (3) of the Act left no question
but that foremen are employees as there defined, and that Section 2(2)
defining employer had merely the purpose of making clear for whose acts
the employer would be responsible under the statute and was not intended
to limit the scope of the term employee as here involved. For purposes of
representing the employer a foreman may fall within the employer definition, but does not thereby lose his rights as an employee where his interests
and those of the employer may be adverse, as involved in fixing his own
wages, hours, et cetera. The company's argument was thought to be primarily directed to the undesirability of permitting foremen to organize
rather than its legality, and thus not a matter for judicial determination.
Apparently the company conceded the right of the foremen to organize
but denied that it had any obligation to recognize or bargain with such
organization. The majority felt the statute left no doubt about the board's
authority to make the determination here involved and that there was ample
evidence to support its finding. There being no ambiguity in the statute,
the opinion denied the validity of resort to legislative history. Whether
the unionization of foremen might be bad industrial policy, as urged, was
quite properly held to be beyond the province of the Court to decide.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas for four members of the
Court first emphasized the important policy questions posed by the majority
opinion which he thought might be extended to include everyone except stockholders with the result that the opposing forces in industry would no longer
be management and labor, but "the operating group on the one hand and
the stockholder or bondholder group on the other." The opinion expressed
the belief that had Congress intended any such basic policy change, such
purpose would have been made clear. According to Mr. Justice Douglas, the
provisions of the statute above referred to should be interpreted as placing in
the employer category all who act for management in formulating and executing labor polcies, and in the employee group only "workingmen and
laborers,

4sa

43a. See Section 2(3) and (11), and Section 14 of the 1947 Act.
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An interesting case for purposes of comparison 'is that of Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board44 in which it was held
that- Congress had so far "occupied the field" of labor relations by the
National Labor Relations Act that when the board in the exercise of its
discretion denied resort to its authority by foremen seeking collective
bargaining representation, as it had done at the time the foremen groups here
in question had applied to the State Labor Board to certify them, it was
beyond the power of the state to apply its policy to foremen and the state
board was without jurisdiction to determine that foremen constituted a
proper bargaining unit.
Two cases recently presented to the supreme court the question of
treating as employees, within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act, and as appropriate units for purposes of collective bargaining, plant
guards, sworn in as auxiliary military police during the war and as deputy
special city police since the end of the war. The case of National Labor
Relations Board v. E. C. Atkins & Ctmpany" involved only the status
of guards who were also civilian auxiliaries to the military police, organized
in a union wholly separate from that representing production and maintenance employees in the plants in question, which was certified by the
National Labor Relations Board as the bargaining unit. In the case of
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation"
was considered the further fact that the guards, after being demilitarized,
as they were in both cases, were deputized as city policemen for purposes of
their plant guard duties, and were organized for collective bargaining purposes as a separate unit of the same union that represented the production
and maintenance workers of the plant.
In both cases the employers had refused to bargain with the certified
representatives on the ground that the guards were not properly to be
regarded as employees within the meaning of the Act for purposes of collective bargaining and that their duties as civilian auxiliaries to the
military police, or as deputy municipal police would be inconsistent with
membership in a union. In both cases the lower courts47 refused to enforce
the board's orders directing employers to bargain.
44. 67 Sup. Ct. 1026 (1947).
45. 67 Sup. Ct. 1265 (1947).
46. 67 Sup. Ct. 1274 (1947).
47. National Labor Relations Board v. E. C. Atkins & Company, 155 F. (2d)
567 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 154 F. (2d) 932 (C.C.A. 6th, 1946).
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By a division of five to four in both cases the Supreme Court sustained
the validity of the board's order. In so doing it was emphasized that, as
found by the board, the guards continued to be employees of the companies for all purposes of wages, hours and conditions of work, including
the matter of hire and discharge except that the military had a veto
power over these matters of employment and dismissal. It was also pointed
out that there had been before the board more than one hundred such
cases in which bargaining units had been certified. In all cases it had been
found that the relationship of employer and employee had continued substantially unchanged by militarization, in so far as the need for collective
bargaining representation was concerned, and that the status as members
of a union had not been found to be inconsistent with the military duties.
involved. Also, the Court emphasized that War Department Regulation,
Circular No. 15, expressly recognized the right of auxiliary military policeto be organized and to bargain collectively, the caution being asserted.
that they should be represented by "a bargaining unit other than that
composed of the production and maintenance workers, although both bargaining units may be affiliated with the same labor organization."
The Court found ample basis to sustain the findings of the board both
as to the matter of continuing employee status and the absence of any
inconsistency between membership in a union and the military status of
guards. The same findings were held to be supported in the case of the
guards deputized as municipal police. In both cases such guards continued
to be subject to the determination of the private employers as to "wages,
hours, benefits and various other conditions of work," and were said to be
properly regarded as employees within the meaning of the Act. "Nor is
there any basis for the intimation that their public duties are such as to,
render incompatible the recognition of rights under the National Labor
Relations Act." 48
These cases are decided expressly on the basis of continuing status as
employees of a private employer and therefore do not answer the questions:
arising out of unionization of purely public employees such as ordinary
municipal police.
Notice should be taken in this discussion of the case of National Labor
Relations Board v. Hearst Publicationzs49 upholding the validity of a
board order based on the determination that newsboys engaged in the
48. 67 Sup. Ct 1274, 1282. See Section 9(b) (3) of the 1947 Act.
49. 322 U.S. 111, 64 Sup. Ct. 851 (1944).
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distribution in Los Angeles of the Hearst papers are employees of the
publishing company within the meaning of the Act and entitled to the
benefits of organization for purpose of collective bargaining. The Court
found ample evidence in the record to support the finding of the board
"that the designated newsboys work continuously and regularly, rely upon
their earnings for the support of themselves and their families, and have
their total wages influenced in large measure by the publishers who dictate
their buying and selling prices, fix their market and control their supply of
papers. Their hours of work and their efforts on the job are supervised
and to some extent prescribed by the publishers or their agents. Much of
their sales equipment and advertising materials is furnished by the publishers with the intention that it be used for the publisher's benefit."'10
The Court emphasized that the determination of employee status under
a federal law with national application was not to be controlled solely
by common law standards which "the courts have applied in distinguishing
between 'employees' and 'independent contractors' when working out
various problems unrelated to the Wagner Act's purposes and provisions,""'
more often than not in dealing with questions of "vicarious liability in
tort," and which not infrequently vary from state to state. Then the Court
asserted that "'technical concepts pertinent to an employer's legal responsibility to third persons for the acts of his servants' have been rejected
in various applications of this Act both here . . . and in other federal
courts.... There is no good reason for invoking them to restrict the scope
of the term 'employee' sought to be done in this case. That term, like
other provisions, must be understood with reference to the purpose of the
Act and the facts involved in the economic relationship. 'Where all the
conditions of the relation require protection, protection ought to be

given.'

))52

The bargaining units approved by the board were made up of those
who sell full-time at established spots on a regular basis, to the exclusion
of the part-time, temporary, or casual distributors. The designation of such
a stable group was thought by the Court to fall well within the discretion of
the board under the statute.
As to both determinations the Court emphasized that Congress, in
making the board's "determinations as to the facts . . . conclusive, if supported by evidence," had "entrusted to it primarily the decision whether
50.

51.

322 U. S. 111, 131.

Id. at 120. But see Section 2(3) of the 1947 Act.
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the evidence establishes the material facts. Hence in reviewing the board's
ultimate conclusions, it is not the court's function to substitute its own
inferences of fact for the board's, when the latter have support in the
'53
record.

D. Voting and Election of BargainingRepresentatives
The case of National Labor Relations Board v. A. J. Tower Co."a
presented a controversy as to the procedure used in elections under the
National Labor Relations Act and the propriety of the board's refusal to
accept an employer's post-election challenge to the eligibility of a voter
who participated in a consent election. The election was held under an
agreement between the company and the union approved by the regional
director for the board, under which the employer supplied the regional
director with "an accurate list of the eligible voters, together with a list of
the ineligible employees," and time was available during which challenges
could be made. Four days after the election and the tally of the ballots
and certification of the results, the company reported that one of those
persons certified and who voted was apparently no longer an employee at
the time of the election and thus not eligible to vote. The company accordingly challenged the vote and requested a hearing. The regional director
ruled that the challenge came too late and applied the general rule of the
board against post-election challenges. This ruling was sustained by the
board and by the Supreme Court, although the circuit court of appeals
thought this matter should have been heard and determined before a
basis could exist for a charge against the company for refusal to bargain
with the union. The Supreme Court found the board rule as here applied
to be reasonable and in accord with the familiar practice in political elections.
Mr. Justice Jackson alone dissented on the ground that anti-union
employees had not had sufficient opportunity to challenge prospective
voters and that their interests were not adequately protected under the
board rules. This matter he considered particularly pertinent here since
the question as to the one voter's eligibility had first been raised by an employee-presumably an anti-union employee.

E. Bargaining Representatives, The Closed Shop, and Discrimination
The problem of the closed shop in one of its important aspects and the
obligation of a certified bargaining representative to represent all employees
52. Id. at 129.
53. Id. at 130.
53a. 67 Sup. Ct. 324 (1946).
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came in for consideration by the Supreme Court late in 1944 in the case
of Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board,'4 in an opinion
that may be more important for some of its implications thn for what was
actually decided. In the background of the case had been a controversy
resulting in a charge by a CIO union that the company was sponsoring an
independent union. This controversy which had developed into a strike of
some duration was settled in an agreement approved by the board and
signed by both unions and the company by which an election was to be
held to determine the bargaining representative. There was some indication of an understanding that the winning union was to be granted a
closed shop contract. Independent won the election and a closed shop contract was entered into. Independent denied membership to 31 CIO men
and demanded that the company discharge them as well as 12 other CIO
men who had not applied for membership in Independent. The ensuing
discharge of these men by the company was held by the board to constitute an unfair labor practice, based on the provision of the statute forbidding an employer to encourage or discourage membership in any union
by discrimination with regard to hire or tenure of employment, although
the same section of the statute also expressly authorizes a closed shop
contract with a labor organization not established, maintained, or assisted
by the company through an unfair labor practice.
In holding the discharges to be an unfair labor practice the board
found that the company had signed the closed shop contract with Independent knowing of and approving the purpose of Independent to demand
the discharges, thus the company could not use the contract as a protection
for its actions. This appeared to be based partially on what had gone on
before the settlement and election, notwithstanding the general board rule
not to go back of settlement in such cases. This was justified by the Court
on the basis that a subsequent unfair labor practice had been found to exist.
The majority opinion emphasized the duty of the certified bargaining
agent to represent all of the employees fairly and impartially, and that no
employee can be deprived of his employment because of his prior affiliation
with any particular union. Said Mr. Justice Black, "We do not construe
the provision authorizing a closed shop contract as indicating an intention
on the part of Congress to authorize a majority of workers and a company,
as in the instant case, to penalize minority groups of workers by depriving
54. 323 U. S. 248, 65 Sup. Ct 238 (1944).
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them of that full freedom of association and self-organization which it was
the prime purpose of the Act to protect for all the workers. It was as
much a deprivation of the rights of these minority employees for the company discriminatorily to discharge them in collaboration with Independent
5
as it would have been had the company done it alone." 4a
While it may be felt, as indicated by the dissenting opinion, that the
company was being put in a difficult position because it had no power to
control the union's policy of admission to membership, the majority opinion
emphasizes that the matter of entry into a closed shop agreement was purely
a matter of bargaining and a matter which the company was free to avoid.
Said Mr. Justice Black, "the company was not compelled by law to enter
into a contract under which it knew that discriminatory discharges of its
54
employees were bound to occur." b
While the only penalty under the Act applies to the company on the
basis of an unfair labor practice, a conceivably more important question,
which the court found it unnecessary to pass upon, may be raised by implication. That question involves the possible illegality or unconstitutionality of the action of the union which has been authorized by federal
statute to represent all of the employees in using that power to discriminate against part of those whom it is authorized to represent. If such a
certified union acts illegally when it discriminates against some employees
among those it is authorized to represent because of race or color, as cases
shortly to be considered hold, is it not more clear of a situation where
the very freedom of association sought to be guaranteed by the statute is
made the basis of arbitrary discrimination?
Other discriminatory cases of a similar nature arising under the Railway Labor Act will be discussed under that heading below.
III.

THE RALWAY LABOR ACT

A. BargainingRepresentatives, The Closed Shop, and Discrimination
Two cases decided the same day as the Wallace case, involving the
same general type of problem, and arising under the Railway Labor Act

are Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Ry. Co. "5 and Tnnstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. 6 Here unions which excluded
54a.
54b.
55.
56.

323 U. S. 248, 256.
Ibid.
323 U. S. 192, 65 Sup. Ct. 226 (1944).
323 U. S. 210, 65 Sup. Ct. 235 (1944).
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Negroes from membership had been designated as employee representatives
under the Railway Labor Act and had made contracts with the employer
railroads discriminating heavily against Negro firemen by restricting their
seniority rights and completely excluding them from certain promotional
employment. In sustaining the right of such Negro firemen in a suit against
the union and against the railroads to enjoin enforcement of the discriminatory agreements, the Supreme Court emphasized that a labor organization
chosen to represent a craft or class of employees under the provisions of
the Railway Labor Act is chosen to represent all of the employees, the
minority as well as the majority, regardless of their union affiliations or
want of them. Said Mr. Chief Justice Stone in the Steele case, "We think
that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative of a
craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the
members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to
give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates ...
We hold that the language of the Act . . . expresses the aim of Congress
to impose on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees
the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those
The
for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them.""
Court concluded that the statute contemplates resort to the usual judicial
remedies of injunction and award of damages for breach of the duty imposed
to represent fairly the whole group.
A very recent decision under the Railway Labor Act by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in Betts v.Easley 8 has reaffirmed the doctrines of these
earlier cases and gone much further in asserting a constitutional right of
all employees based on the Fifth Amendment to equal participation in
and equal representation by the union which derives its authority to act
as exclusive bargaining representative from the affirmative provisions of
a Federal statute. The closed shop was not involved in this case and the
Negro workmen were admitted to membership in separate lodges affiliated
with the organization here designated as representative, but with rights of
participation definitely subordinate to the dominant group. The claim
was put forward that since membership in the union was voluntary, no
right existed to complain about the limitations placed upon Negro membership. In rejecting this contention it was asserted that "This Court cannot be blind to present day realities affecting labor in large industrial
57. 323 U. S. 192, 202, 203.
58. 161 Kan. 459, 169 P. (2d) 831 (1946).
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plants. The individual workman cannot just 'go it alone.' Every person
with an understanding of mass production and other features of modem
industry long ago recognized the necessity of collective bargaining by labor
representatives, freely chosen, if human rights are to be adequately safeguarded. In the Railway Labor Act, Congress gave clear and firm recognition to this necessity. This liberal and enlightened view having been
written into the statute, it must follow that a union acting as the exclusive
bargaining agent under the law, for all employees, cannot act arbitrarily,
cannot deny equality of privilege, to individuals or minority groups merely
because membership in the organization is voluntary. To hold otherwise
would dd violence to basic principles of our American system. . . . The
acts complained of are in violation of the Fifth Amendment.!'"
Another interesting state case of this period presenting the question
whether a closed shop agreement may be enforced by a labor union,
together with a closed or partially closed union membership, is that of
James v. Marinsip Corporation,° decided by the Supreme Court of California without reliance upon any applicable statute.
The facts of the case were quite similar to those of Betts v. Easley in
that Negroes were permitted membership only in an auxiliary organization
with restricted rights definitely inferior to those attaching to full membership in the union reserved to white employees, and the case was dealt with
as the equivalent of complete exclusion of Negroes from membership, the
court saying that "the fundamental question in this case is whether a
closed union coupled with a closed shop is a legitimate objective of organized
6
labor." 1
While it was recognized that the ship-building industry here involved
may affect interstate commerce so as to make the National Labor Relations Act applicable, and, for all that appears, the union here may or may
not have been certified as the bargaining agent by the National Labor
Relations Board, nothing is made to depend upon that fact, the court
merely noting that the portion of the Act authorizing a closed shop contains
nothing which can properly be construed as giving the union "a right to
maintain a closed or partially closed membership together with a closed
shop agreement.116 2 The case was thus decided on the basis of common law
doctrines unaffected by any public status acquired by the union being
59.
60.
61.
62.

161 Kan. 469.
25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1945).
25 Cal. (2d) 721, 730.
Id. at 735.
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designated as bargaining representative under a statute as was involved
in the cases discussed above.
The union had based its contentions partially on the fact that under
the law of California the closed shop is lawful, and that likewise under that
State's law voluntary associations such as labor unions had always been
recognized as having a right to limit membership to persons mutually
acceptable. But the court insisted that it did not "follow ... that a union
may maintain both a closed shop agreement or other form of labor
monopoly together with a closed or partially closed membership."03 In so
holding the court called forth an analogy to the common law status of inn
keepers and common carriers in their obligation to serve all alike. "In
our opinion," said the court, "an arbitrarily closed or partially closed union
is incompatible with a closed shop. Where a union has, as in this case,
attained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means of closed shop agreements and other forms of collective labor action, such a union occupies a
quasi public position similar to that of a public service business and it has
certain corresponding obligations. It may no longer claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal organizations.
Its asserted right to choose its own members . . . affects the fundamental
right to work for a living."01 The opinion then quoted with approval from
an earlier New Jersey case to the effect that '"the union could either restrict
its membership at pleasure or contract with employers that all work shall
be given to its members but that it could not do both."
While recognizing that some cases in the past have taken the position
that state legislation is necessary as a basis on which to enforce such a
public policy, the California court accepted as preferable those decisions
which have asserted such a public policy without statutory aid.
In sustaining a lower court injunction directed both against the union
and the employer and restraining the discharge of Negro employees because
not members of the union with which the employer had a closed shop
agreement, the court expressly avoided passing on the question whether,
in the absence of a closed shop agreement, the union would be required to
open its membership to all qualified employees, regardless of color, but
held that the union could not maintain both. a closed shop and a closed
63. Id. at 730, 731.
64. Id. at 731.
65. Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 A.
720 (1938).
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or partially closed union, and directed that "negroes must be admitted
to membership under the same terms and conditions applicable to nonnegroes unless the union and the employer refrain from enforcing the closed
6G
shop agreement against them.
As against the contention of the company here involved that the restraining order should not be directed against it because of its obligation
under the National Labor Relations Act to enforce the closed shop agreement without looking behind a notice from the union that a particular
employee is not in good standing, the court asserted that the company
had full knowledge of the facts in the controversy and by complyink with
the union's demands had assisted in making effective the discrimination,
and, without being directed to take affirmative action or subjected to
penalty for past action, it could properly be restrained as a means of making
the order against the union fully effective.
These cases may well be thought to pave the way for alleviation of
many of the evils alleged to exist in the dosed shop from the standpoint
of the best interests of the employee and his so-called "right to work"
without the necessity of restrictive legislation so widely under consideration at the present timeY.
Another state case that may well be mentioned in connection with the
matter of discrimination is Railway Mail Assn v. CorsP8 wherein was
66. 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 745.
67. Obviously referring to this group of cases, particularly the Wallace and
Steele cases, Lee Pressman, General Counsel for the CIO, in an address before a
regional conference of the American Bar Association in Omaha in January, 1947, said, "the Supreme Court has in effect decided that a labor union enjoying the rights granted by the National Labor Relations Act and-the Railway
Labor Act to engage in collective bargaining as the exclusive representative cannot
discriminate in the bargaining process against non-member employees." Then he
said, "it is my belief that the obligation not to discriminate should include the obligation to accept all the employees into equal membership." It would seem that the
above cases constitute a move in the direction of requiring adherence to that suggested belief.
Incidentally it might be observed that that American Bar Association meeting
in Omaha devoted largely to a discussion of labor law problems and featuring a joint
discussion by Mr. Pressman for labor and Robert D. Morgan of Peoria, a lawyer
representing industry, on the subject of "Improving the Processes of Collective
Bargaining" marked a healthy development in the legal profession in its attitude
toward the solution of labor-management problems. Happily that cooperative
-effort on the part of lawyers representing both labor and industry to bring before
the profession intelligent and fair discussion of such problems is now being repeated
elsewhere. The addresses of Mr. Pressman and Mr. Morgan are published in 12
Mo. L. Rav. 1, 10 (1947). In re closed shop see Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) of
the 1947 Act.
68. 326 U. S. 88, 65 Sup. Ct. 1483 (1945).
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involved a New York statute which prohibits a labor organization from
denying membership on account of race, color, or creed, or from denying
to any member equal treatment for similar reasons. This statutory provision was alleged to offend the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an interference with the right of the union in the selection
of its members. Speaking for a unanimous United States Supreme Court in
upholding the validity of this statute, Mr. Justice Reed said the Fourteenth
Amendment "was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color. We see no constitutional basis for the contention that a state cannot protect workers from
exclusion solely on the basis of race, color, or creed by an organization,
functioning under the protection of the state, which holds itself out to
represent the general business needs of employees." 9
There are a few other Railway Labor Act cases that should be mentioned, though the doctrines asserted may well apply also under the
National Labor Relations Act.
For purposes of comparison with the anti-discrimination cases attention might be called to the more recent case of Lewellyn v. Fleming,0
arising under the Railway Labor Act and decided by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in which individual seniority rights of an employee were
held to be not improperly destroyed by a collective bargaining agreement.
The court took the position that the "agreement between the Railroad
Company and the Brotherhood was made pursuant to a basic Congressional policy" set forth in the Railway Labor Act, "and superseded the
prior individual contract of employnent. . . . This is not an individual
grievance which falls outside the collective interest of the craft, and therefore outside the scope of the collective bargaining authority of the statutory
representative,"' 71 as in the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway case referred
to below. Neither was there any discrimination involved here. The court
concluded that the "appellant has no constitutional right to insist upon
the observance of a private contract, the effect of which is to deny tile
incidence of a contract entered into in furtherance of an expressed con'
gressional policy, which the Congress is free to adopt. "2

69. 326 U. S. 88, 94.
70. 154 F. (2d) 211 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946). The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 67 Sup. Ct. 45 (1946).
71. Id. at 213.
72. Id. at 214.
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In the case of Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley the Supreme
Court made it clear that the power of a collective bargaining representative
under the Railway Labor Act is to make collective agreements for the
future, but does not extend to the settlement of claims of employees for
damages for past breach by the, employer under the collective agreement,
without giving the individual employee an effective voice in the settlement,
or without proof that -the employee has in some legally effective way
authorizd the bargaining agent to represent him in the settlement of such
grievances.
IV. THE NORRIS-LAGuARDIA ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
The case of United States v. American Federation of Msiians- involving the exercise of alleged dictatorial powers by James C. Petrillo over
the making of musical recordings, voluntary amateur musical performances over the air, and the employment of unnecessary stand-by musicians,
in which a restraining order was sought on the ground of violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, was disposed of on the basis of being a case
growing out of or involving a labor dispute to which the Norris-LaGuardia
Act's anti-injunction provisions are applicable. Among other things, the
court said the union was merely seeking a "closed shop so far as phonograph records, electrical transcriptions and amateur musicians are concerned," that the question of whether this involves a dispute as to a "term
or condition of employment" so as to bring it within the application of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act had been answered by Congress itself in/the
National Labor Relations Act, Section 8(3), where it says, " . . .nothing
in ...this title ... shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment
membership therein." Here Congress itself speaks of an agreement for a
closed shop as a "condition of employment."7 4a
The court also excluded from the application of the Sherman Act the
action here by the union in demanding a contract "for a 'closed shop' (in
a sense large enough to include a shop which excludes not only non-union
workers but also machines)" on the ground that the contract is sought
primarily for the workers' benefit and not for the benefit of a non-labor
group, within the doctrine of the Hutckeson case discussed infra.
M

73. 325 U. S. 711,,65 Sup. Ct. 1282 (1945).
74. 47 F. Supp. 304 (1942). Affirmed by Supreme Court by a per curiam
opinion in 318 U. S. 741, 63 Sup. Ct. 665 (1943).
74a. Id. at 308.
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The so-called Lea Act" prohibiting coercive practices affecting broadcasting was passed as an immediate result of this case and was held invalid
by a federal district court in Illinois,T but very recently has been sustained as valid by the Supreme Court of the United States.7
While this statute and the adjudications under it are distinct from and
unrelated to the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act
and might well be taken up separately under a distinct heading, the fact
that the basic labor problems involved in the cases are the same makes
it not wholly inappropriate to discuss the matter here.
This statute, passed as an amendment to the Federal Communications
Act of 1934, declares that "it shall be unlawful, by the use or express or
implied threat of the use of force, violence, intimidation, or duress, or by
the use or express or implied threat of the use of other means (italics supplied), to coerce, compel or constrain, or attempt to coerce, compel or
constrain a licensee, (1) to employ or agree to employ . . .any person or
persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to
perform actual services."
James C. Petrillo, President of the Chicago Federation of Musicians,
was charged with having violated this statute by (1) directing and causing three employees of Station WAAF, members of the union, to discontinue
their employment, (2) directing and causing other members of the union
not to accept employment, and (3) placing and causing to be placed a
picket in front of the place of business of the station, all in an "attempt
to coerce, compel and constrain said licensee to employ ...in connection
with the conduct of its radio broadcasting business, three additional
persons not needed by said licensee to perform actual services."
The dictrict court held the statute invalid as in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution because of its indefiniteness and uncertainty in the definition of a criminal offense, since there is no guide by
which defendant may know "the number of employees needed." Further
the Act was held violative of the First Amendment as penalizing peaceful
picketing merely for the purpose of disseminating the views of the defendant
and the members of the union which is an exercise of the right of free
speech. The Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments were thought to be violated
by the restrictions upon the employment of labor, if the alleged acts of "(1)

75. 47 U.S.C.A. 506.

76. United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845 (1946).
77. Decided June 23, 1947. 67 Sup. Ct 1538 (1947).
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causing three musicians to discontinue their employment; and (2) causing
three musicians not to accept employment by such licensee" can be made
criminal offenses under the Act. Finally, in spite of the absence of an equal
protection clause applicable to the National Government, the classification
as between employees and employers and as between broadcasting and
other communication industries was thought to be so arbitrary as to be
violative of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
On its last decision day of the 1946 term, June 23, 1947, the Supreme
Court reversed this decision, sustaining in general terms the constitutional
validity of the statute, but did not deal with the application of its provisions to the facts of the particular case, so remanded the case to the
district court. The district court had dismissed the charge against Petrillo
solely on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional as written without going into the merits of the case, so the only question before the
Supreme Court as the case was presented under the Criminal Appeals Act
for direct review by the Supreme Court in such cases was the constitutional
validity of the statute on its face, wholly without regard to its application
in the particular case.
The majority opinion refuted, one by one, the bases upon which the
court below had found the statute unconstitutional. First as to indefiniteness, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, admitted that "clearer
and more precise language might have been framed by Congress to
express what it meant by 'number of employees needed,"' but concluded
that "the language Congress used provides an adequate warning as to
what conduct falls under its ban, and marks the boundaries sufficiently
distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law in accordance
'7
with the will of Congress.1'
The charge of denial of equal protection so flagrant as to be violative
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because not made applicable to employers or other employees than those engaged in radio
broadcasting, was, apparently, not regarded too seriously by the Supreme
Court, but conceived to fall within the general doctrine long familiar in the
application of state police power legislation by which it is recognized that
a legislature may prohibit some practice thought to give rise to particular
evils without making its statute so broad as to embrace all that might have
been included.
77a. Id. at 1542.
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The matter of freedom of speech alleged to be involved by making
peaceful picketing a crime was held to require consideration only when
the application of the statute to the facts of the case came to be dealt with,
and since the Court was here passing only on the constitutionality of the
Act as written, the matter was not properly before the Court. The final
allegation of conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment was disposed of in
the same way.
Mr. Justice Reed, joined by Justices Murphy and Rutledge, dissented
solely on the first ground that the Act is too vague and indefinite to be
upheld as a criminal statute.
The practical application of the statute must await the further action
of the lower court.77b
The issue of enjoining labor violence and the application of the NorrisLaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act came before the court in an interesting
way in 1944 in the case of Brotherhood of Railroad Traimnez, Enterprise
Lodge No. 27 v. Toledo P. & W. R. R.7 8 Section 8 of the statute provides
that "no restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant ... who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such
dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental
machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration."
The opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge for a unanimous Court admitted
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not intended to interfere with the power
to restrain violent acts, "but one major purpose of the Act was to prevent
the use of injunction improperly as a strike-breaking implement." Here
while the company had accepted the mediation services of the government it
had flatly refused to accept arbitration. And while the Railway Labor Act
here applicable makes it clear that arbitration is to remain on a purely
voluntary basis, the express requirements of Section 8 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act were thought to make it clear that injunctive relief could
not be granted since the employer had not "made every reasonable effort
to settle the dispute" within the meaning of the statute by accepting
voluntary arbitration.
By far the most important recent case involving the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, perhaps the most important since that act's passage, and a case
without some discussion of which any survey of recent developments in
77b. See also the more general anti-featherbedding provision in Section 8(b) (6)
of the 1947Act.
78. 321 U. S. 50, 64 Sup. Ct. 413 (1944).
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the field of labor law would be most incomplete, is that of United States v.
9
(Same v. John L. Lewis). Quite
United Mine Workers of AmericaF
obviously space will not permit a detailed discussion of the five separate
opinions running to approximately 130 printed pages.
The background of facts are probably sufficiently familiar to all. The
mines were being operated last October (1946) under the so-called KrugLewis agreement of May 29, 1946, by which it was stated that the "terms
and conditions of employment were (to be) controlled 'for the period of
government possession."' Lewis claimed that this agreement carried forward Section 15 of the earlier (April 1, 1945) National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement under which "either party to the contract was privileged
to give ten days' notice in writing of a desire for a negotiating conference
which the other party was required to attend; fifteen days after the beginning of that conference either party might give notice in writing of the
termination of the agreement, effective five days after receipt of such
notice." Lewis in his letter of October 21 requested such a conference to
begin November 1. While the government denied that this clause continued in effect, and denied that any power thus existed to, terminate the
agreement by unilateral declaration, a meeting did take place, and Lewis
gave notice November 15 of termination of the agreement on November 20,
which, with adherence to the formula "no contract, no work," meant for
all practical purposes a strike.8 0
Suit was brought for declaratory judgment seeking a ruling that Lewis
and the United Mine Workers had no power unilaterally to terminate the
agreement, and including a request for a temporary restraining order.
Such temporary order was granted restraining defendants from continuing
in effect the November 15 notice, or other action to interfere with the
continued operation of the mines. The strike took place as scheduled and
the government filed a petition for a rule to show cause why defendant
should not be punished for contempt.
The result of that trial, holding that the power of the district court to
issue the restraining order in this case was not affected by either the
Norris-LaGuardia Act or the Clayton Act, subjecting Lewis to a fine of
$10,000.00 and the United Mine Workers to a fine of $3,500,000.00 ane

79. 67 Sup. Ct. 677 (1947).
80. See Section 501(2) of 1947 Act.
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issuing a preliminary injunction in terms similar to the original restraining
order to remain effective until a final determnaton of the case, is well known.
The case was commonly expected to turn on the question of whether
the anti-injunction provisions of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act apply to a case in which the government is a party. The principal
contention of defendants was that the orders of the district court in this
case were in violation of those statutes. And while the decision of the
Supreme Court, in the view upheld by the majority, held that those
statutes do not apply, its sustaining of the district court's orders, except
for modfying the fine assessed against the union, did not rest solely on
that ground.
In the first place the majority opinion, written by Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson, as his first major opinion, pointed out that although Section 20 of
the Clayton Act expressly provides that "no such restraining order or
injunction shall prohibit any person or persons . . . from recommending,
advising, or persuading others . . ." to strike, its provisions are also "made
applicable only to cases 'between an employer and employees, or between
employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment' . . .", which properly interpreted
should not apply to the Government in this case, and that the same reasoning applies to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
This conclusion was arrived at first, by the reasoning that as a general
proposition "statutes ... that divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not
be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect," and "with
knowledge of that rule, Congress would not, in writing the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, omit to use 'clear and specific (language) to that effect' if it actually
intended to reach the Government in all cases."81
Then emphasizing that the Act was predicated, as set forth in its statement of policy, upon the contrast in bargaining power between the individual unorganized worker and the employer owner of property organized
in corporate form under governmental authorization, and the comparative
helplessness of the individual worker to exercise any actual freedom of contract in an effective way, the Court suggested that the purpose of the Act
was "to contribute to the worker's 'full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing to negotiate the
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the
81.

67 Sup. Ct. 677, 686.
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interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their' agents, in
the designation of such representatives ... for the purpose of collective bargaining. . . .' These considerations, on their face, obviously," said Chief
Justice Vinson, "do not apply to the Government as an employer or to
relations between the Government and its employees."812
Next the opinion took up Sections 4 and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act restricting application to cases "involving or growing out of a labor
dispute" and concluded that the word "person" as used in that part of the
Act defining a "labor dispute," while not itself defined, does not, in the
absence of clearly expressed intent by Congress to the contrary, include
the Government as such person.
Finally, the opinion reinforces this conclusion by what it purports to
find in the legislative history of the Act in its passage through Congress,
which is only that the legislative history indicated "that Congress, in passing
the Act, did not intend to permit the United States to continue to intervene
by injunction in purely private labor disputes,"183 and "did not intend to,
withdraw the Government's existing rights to injunctive relief against its
own employees."" 4
Thus, said the Court, "we accordingly adhere to our conclusion that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not affect the jurisdiction of the courts to.
issue injunctions when sought by the United States in a labor dispute with
its own employees."' 5
The contention that the Congress, in passing the War Labor Disputes
Act and rejecting Section 5 of the Connally substitute bill which would expressly have permitted issuing injunctions to restrain violations of the Act,
showed a purpose inconsistent with the Court's present construction, was
rejected by the majority, as was also the further contention that the miners
were in reality still employees of the private employers to which the Act
applied rather than government employees. "Congress intended," said the
Chief Justice, "that by virtue of Government seizure, a mine should become,
for purposes of production and operation, a Government facility"'86 and that
"for the purposes of tkis case, the incidents of the relationship existing
between the Government and the workers are those of governmental em82.
83.
84.
85.
,86.

Id. at 687.
Id.at 688.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 690.
Id. at 691.
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and that "the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not

apply."881
A second sufficient basis was asserted by the majority opinion, and by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion, for sustaining the orders
of the district court, even if it should have been held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should apply. This theory, while not altogether a new one,
but one which allegedly had been used previously and for which precedents
were cited, is nevertheless a somewhat confusing one by which a court appears to be pulling itself up by its own judicial bootstraps.
As preliminary to applying this theory the Court pointed out that the
Government had asked "a declaratory judgment in respect to the right of the
defendant to terminate the contract by unilateral action," and that Mr.
Lewis' "official notice" of termination had amounted to a strike call. "Pending a determination" in the declaratory judgment proceedings "of defendant's right to take this action, the Government requested a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief. .

.

. In these circumstances, the dis-

trict court," said the Chief Justice, "unquestionably had the power to issue
a restraining order ... to preserve existing conditions while it was determin-

ing its own authority to grant injunctive relief. The defendants in making
their private determination of the law, acted at their peril. Their disobedience is punishable as criminal contempt."B9
After finding that the district court was right as to its finding as to
both civil and criminal contempt, the Supreme Court said "if the NorrisLaGuardia Act were applicable in this case, the conviction for civil contempt would be reversed in its entirety."
But assuming "that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to this case and
prohibited injunctive relief at the request of the United States, we would
set aside the preliminary injunction of December 4 and the judgment for
civil contempt; but we would ... affirm the judgments for criminal contempt
as validly punishing violations of an order then outstanding and unreversed.""0

In other words, even if the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply and it is
determined that the district court had no right to issue the injunction,
nevertheless while it is in the process of deciding whether that Act did
87. Id. at 692.

88. Id. at 694.

89. Id. at 695.
90. Id. at 697.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss3/1

36

1947]

Howard: Howard: Recent Labor Cases 1941-1947

SOME RECENT LABOR CASES: 1941-1947

271

or did not apply, it could properly issue an injunctive order to maintain
the status quo until the issue was finally determined, and pending that final
determination any violation of that order is just as punishable as it would
have been if it had been finally determined that the court was wholly unaffected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
It was upon this basis, and this alone, that Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurred. Presumably that is also true of Mr. Justice Jackson, though his
position is not made clear by the bare statement that he joins in the majority
"opinion except as to the Norris-LaGuardia Act which he thinks relieved
the courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in this class of caseY'91
One last aspect of the majority opinion is the holding that the fine
of $3,500,000.00 on the Union is excessive and is reduced to $700,000.00, with
the proviso that it must pay the remaining $2,800,000.00 "unless defendant
Union, within five days after the issuance of the mandate herein, shows
that it has fully complied with the temporary restraining order issued
November 18, 1946, and the preliminary injunction issued December 4,
1946." This full compliance can be effected by the Union "only by withdrawing unconditionally the notice given by it, signed by John L. Lewis,
President, on November 15, 1946, to J. A. Krug, Secretary of the Interior,
terminating the Krug-Lewis agreement as of ...November 20,. . . and by
notifying, at the same time, its members of such withdrawal, " 12 so that the
Krug-Lewis agreement shall remain in full force and effect until the final
determination of the basic issues arising under said agreement. 93
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion made a very strong
case for the proposition that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should be held to
be fully applicable to this case. In so doing he quite properly approached
the matter on the basis of the specific wording of the statute depriving "the
federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes except
under conditions not here relevant."
He found a labor dispute to exist as defined by the Act, and emphasized
that the Act "does not deal with the rights of the parties but with the
91.

Id. at 703.

92. Id. at 702.

93. On March 17, 1947, the following order was issued by the Supreme Court.
"On consideration of the motion of the United States for the issuance of the mandate in these cases prior to the expiration of the 25-day period provided in Rule 34,
it is ordered that the mandate issue March 20, 1947." Wihin the time limit prescribed it was determined that full compliance with the order had been had and
the union was released from its contingent obligation to pay the additional $2,800,000.00 fine.
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power of the courts," being an act "to define and limit the jurisdiction of
courts sitting in equity," and found that "nothing in the Act remotely hints
that the withdrawal of this power turns on the character of the parties."
Rather, he asserted, "the limitation on the jurisdiction of the court depends
entirely on the subject matter of the controversy." He found the controversy
here to be one "growing out of a labor dispute" within the meaning of the
statute, and asserted that the alleged exception found by the Court in
this case was found "not in the Act but outside it."'"
Such a holding he regarded as clearly inconsistent with the purposes of
Congress in passing the anti-injunction acts to put an end to the possibilities
of a recurrence of cases like the Debs and Railway Shopmen's injunctions.
He also found the legislative history of the War Labor Disputes Act
strqngly to support this conclusion, not the least important part of which
was the fact that in that Act "specific remedies were formulated by Congress against interference with the Government's operation" of seized plants.
Yet "the injunction," though strongly urged, "was not included."", Said he
finally, "the whole course of legislation indicates that Congress withheld the
remedy of injunction. This court now holds that Congress authorized the
injunction."981
Notwithstanding his very vigorous and able dissent from the majority
holding as to the non-applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act under the
circumstances of this case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in "the opinion
of the Court insofar as it sustans the judgment for criminal contempt upon
the broad ground of vindicating the process of law."' 17 He argued that pending the determination of the case the court could properly maintain the
status quo and punish any departure therefrom. Since admittedly the "district
court had the power to decide whether this case was properly before it, it
could make appropriate orders so as to afford the necessary time for fair
consideration and decision while existing conditions were preserved. To say
that the authority of the court may be flouted during the time necessary
to decide is to reject the requirements of the judicial process .... When in
a real controversy (claim not obviously frivolous), such as is now here, an
appeal is made to law, the issue must be left to the judgment of courts and

94.
95.
96.
97.

67 Sup. Ct. 677, 706.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 705.
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not the personal judgment of one of the parties. This principle is a postulate
of our democracy."' 8
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in part and dissented in part.
They agreed with the majority that neither the Norris-LaGuardia Act nor
the War Labor Disputes Act "barred the Government from obtaining the
injunction it sought in these proceedings." Said their opinion, "the 'labor
disputes' with which Congress was concerned in the Norris-LaGuardia Act
were those between private employers and their employees. As to all such
'labor disputes,' the Act .. .barred relief by injunction except under very
narrow circumstances, whether injunction be sought by private employers,
the Government, or anyone else."""
To support their conclusion that Congress did not intend the Act to
apply they said, "Congress had never in its history provided a program for
fixing wages, hours, and working conditions of its employees by collective
bargaining. Working conditions of Government employees had not been the
subject of collective bargaining, nor been settled as a result of labor dis'
they asserted, and felt it would take specific language in the Act
putes,""'
to make it apply.
As an apparent answer to the contention that the Government might
merely take over plants so as in effect to seek an injunction for the benefit
of private employers, they emphasized that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
would prevent that and that Government control here is so far complete
under its seizure that the miners can properly be regarded as employees of
the Government.
The point as to the Norris-LaGuardia Act preventing this was, apparently, that in any pretended taking over for the benefit of private employers government control would not be genuine, the dispute in reality would
be between the private employers and their employees to which the NorrisLaGuardia Act would still be applicable, notwithstanding the action of the
Government. Possibly this may raise a question as to the public welfare
situation involved in such a case where there has been no previous seizure
by the Government and a threatened strike in coal mining, railroad operation, telephone and telegraph operation, or any other public service enterprise would very seriously affect the general public health, safety, or welfare. Suppose that the Government, moved solely by the serious conse98. Id. at 704,705.
99. Id. at 713.
100. Ibid.
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quences to the public, takes over the enterprise and asks for an injunctionshould it be granted? Secondly, assume it is granted and then the enterprise is returned to the private owner. True we have protected the public
against a tie-up with all of its disastrous effects, but we have also, in effect,
decided the immediate controversy in favor of one of the parties without
any consideration of the merits-something the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
°
calculated to preventl oa
Justices Black and Douglas dissented with respect to the matter of
the fines. They agreed with the majority ruling in modifying the District
Court's decree so as to provide a coercive sanction in the form of a conditional fine, to be payable only if the union failed to obey the affirmative
order of the Court, but dissented from that part of the ruling which imposed
an absolute fine of $700,000.00. In so doing they referred to such cases as
Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co.1°1 for the proposition that the object is "not to punish for an offense against the public, but to compel obedience to valid court orders, and where the circumstances justify unconditional punishment for past disobedience it "may well constitute an exercise of "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed'. . . ." Here
they asserted the "'end proposed' was affiirmative action . . . to prevent interruption of coal production pending final adjudication of the controversy,"
and they thought it clear that a "conditional civil sanction (here the conditional fine of $2,800,000.00) would bring at least as prompt and unequivocal
obedience to the court's order as would criminal punishment for past disobedience." Important among the reasons for this view was their conviction that the defendants "appear to have believed in good faith, though er01
roneously, that they were acting within their legal rights".Y
A second reason for objecting to the large unconditional fine was the
fact that the acts of the defendants here in question were punishable as offenses under the War Labor Disputes Act, and "that act provides a maximum punishment of $5,000.00 and one year imprisonment for those who in08
terfere with the operation of mines taken over by the United States."'
Thus Justices Black and Douglas would have made the total fines of
both Lewis and the union payable conditionally, "only in the event that
full and unconditional obedience to the temporary injunction, including
100a. This whole question is moot at present since the War Labor Disputes
Act, which constituted the basis for government seizure, expired by its own limitations on June 30, 1947, and the 1947 Act does not authorize such seizure.
101. 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492 (1911).
102. 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 715.
103. Id. at 716.
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withdrawal of the notice which purpoted to terminate the contract, is not
had on or before a day certain.' 1°4
Two members of the Court, Justices Rutledge and Murphy, dissented
on all points, each writing a separate dissenting opinion.
Mr. Justice Rutledge thought the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
showed conclusively that the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act should be
applied, and that "the legislative history that he marshals so accurately,
and cogently compels the conclusion that the War Labor Disputes Act...
not only confirms the applicability of the earlier statute but itself excludes
resort to injunctive relief for enforcement of its own provisions in situations
of this sort.'"i1 He pointed out that "that Act expressly provides the remedies for its own enforcement. Beyond seizure of plants, mines and facilities
for temporary governmental operation, they are exclusively criminal in
character," 0 0 and clearly do not include injunctive relief.
In supplementing this reliance on legislative history, Mr. Justice Rutledge emphasized the state of the war effort at the time the War Labor Disputes Act was passed in 1943, the fact that the great body of "American
workers was bending to the patriotic duty of peak production for war purposes," and that many reasons would exist for Congress not wishing to depart from the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but rather to rely, as it
plainly did, "on the added powers of enforcement expressly conferred by the
Act, namely the power of seizure and the force of the criminal sanction, to
accomplish the needed results. 107
In the second place, Mr. Justice Rutledge vigorously disagreed with the
proposition that punishment for contempt may stand though the Act of
Congress under which the court is operating is finally construed to deny to
the court the right to issue the injunction for the violation of which the contempt punishment was meted out, as sustained by the majority and as was
the basis of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion. "The force of
such a rule," he asserted, "making the party act on pain of certain punishment regardless of the validity of the order violated or the court's jurisdiction to enter it as determined finally upon review, would be not only to
compel submission. It would be also in practical effect for many cases to
terminate the litigation, foreclosing the substantive rights involved without
104.
105.
106.
107.

Ibid.
Id. at 720..
Ibid.
Id. at 722, 723.
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any possibility for their effective appellate review and determination. " 108
He also denied that the Shippo 9 case principally relied upon by the majority
stood for any such doctrine, or that the doctrine of that case, properly interpreted, or of any other case, required the result here arrived at.
To follow this doctrine of the majority might well result, Mr. Justice
Rutledge believed, in the nullification of fundamental constitutional rights
"by the force of invalid orders issued in flat violation of the constitutional
privisions securing them, and void for that reason." And in this connection
he emphasized that "it was because these were so often the effects, not simply of final orders entered after determination upon the merits, but of interlocutory injunctions and ex parte restraining orders, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act became law and ... the War Labor Disputes Act continued in
force its policy."' The effect of such orders in labor disputes, he asserted,
as is well known, was "most often to break the strike without regard to its
legality ... and render moot and abortive the substantive controversy m'"1
Mr. Justice Murphy concurred in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Rutledge, and added a short separate dissenting opinion of his own, asserting that the very language of Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, distinctly taking from the federal courts the power to issue injunctions in labor disputes, is sufficient to dispose of the case, and also felt that the possible
implications of the decision "cast a dark cloud over the future of labor relations" in this country, and emphasized that while the grave economic
emergency called imperatively for some effective action to break the stalemate, "the conversion of the judicial process into a weapon for misapplying
statutes according to the grave exigencies of the moment... can have tragic
consequences even more serious and lasting than a temporary dislocation of
the nation's economy resulting from a strike of the miners."'l
Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should
apply is rendered inevitable by his conclusion that the miners remained at
all times private employees of private employers, "despite the temporary
gloss of government possession and operation of the mines," and bear no
resemblance whatever to employees of the executive departments, the independent agencies and other branches of the Government. . . . When all is
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 724.
United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 27 Sup. Ct. 165 (1906).
67 Sup. Ct. 677, 725.
Id. at 717.
Ibid
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said and done the obvious fact remains that this case involves and grows
out of a labor dispute between the operators and the miners."' ,-2 He emphasized that the Government concededly could not secure an injunction in a
private labor dispute where there had been no seizure, no matter how vitally
the public interest might be affected, and he regarded an injunction where
a seizure had taken place as equally contrary to the language and policy of
the statute.
Justice Murphy also foresaw the danger of this power being employed in
some future emergency as a basis for using seizure as a subterfuge for breaking all strikes in private industry, whenever a finding could be made that the
public interest was in peril. This, he asserted, is what makes this decision
"so full of dangerous implications for the future," 113 and emphasized that if
such a policy is to be decided upon, it is the function of Congress and not
the Court to make the decision.
Mr. Justice Murphy also dissented from the proposition that punishment for contempt can be applied for violating a temporary order later determined to be void. That exact situation, he felt, was an important factor
in bringing about the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act calculated to
put an end to it. While he gave pointed recognition to the asserted feeling
that the actions of Mr. Lewis and the miners "threatened orderly constitutional government and the economic and social stability of the nation," he
equally emphasized that the Court must obey the mandates of Congress, and
asserted that while "a judicial disregard of what Congress has decreed may
seem justified for the moment in view of the crisis which gave birth to this
case, ... such a disregard may ultimately have more disastrous and lasting
effects upon the economy of the nation than any action of an aggressive
labor leader in disobeying a void court order."' 14 Thus he would have reversed the order of the district court in toto.
In the light of the possible implications of this case as viewed by the
dissenting justices, and in the light of recent and proposed legislation, state
and national, the labor injunction has again assumed an importance which
14
it had not had since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." a

113.
114.
114a.
restored
struction

Id. at 718.
Id. at 719.
Any complete understanding of the extent to which the labor injunction is
by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 must await its conand application by the courts.
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V. THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST AcT
Two cases of major importance involving questions of application of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to labor unions came to the United States Supreme Court in 1945. They are Allen Rrad/ey Co. v. Local Union No. 3,,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,2"5 and Hunt v. Crumbock, " While the total problem here involved is too complicated for any
exhaustive treatment in this discussion, some consideration is in order. The
background of broad application of the Sherman Act to combinations of
labor prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914 is well known, at
least in a general way. Its application by means of the injunctive process
was sought to be ended by Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act in terms
prohibiting the use of injunctions in "any case between an employer and
employees ...involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment," with certain limited exceptions. That these provisions, so far as apparently intended to provide a broad exemption for labor
organizations from application of the Sherman Act and from control by the
injunctive process, were effectively nullified by the Supreme Court in such
decisions as Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering,"* Bedford Cit Stone Co. v.
Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n.,"18 and others is also a matter of more or
less general knowledge, with the result that the extensive use and abuse of
the labor injunction, particularly in the Sherman Act cases, led to the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act in 1932.
Then in 1940 came the decision by the Supreme Court of the case of
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader" 9 in which it was emphasized by Mr. Justice
Stone that the Sherman Act "was enacted in the era of 'trusts' and of 'combinations' of businesses and capital organized and directed to control the
market by suppression of competition in the marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter of public concern. The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition
in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production,
raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers
or consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as
a special form of public injury."'"2 It was accordingly held that the Act was
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

325 U. S. 797, 65 Sup. Ct. 1533 (1945).
325 U. S.82!, 65 Sup. Ct. 1545 (1945).
254 U. S.443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
274 U. S.37, 47 Sup. Ct.522 (1927).
310 U. S.469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982 (1940).
310 U. S.469, 493.
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not intended to apply to striking employees who, by acts of violence in the
conduct of a strike shut down production and prevented interstate shipment of goods by the employer, when the combination of such employees did
not have a purpose to raise or fix the market price, and "did not have as its
purpose restraint upon competition in the market for petitioner's product"121and did not in fact have such effect.
The next year brought before the high Court the case of United States
v. Htutcheson1 22 in which an attempt was made to apply the Sherman Act
to a jurisdictional strike and a boycott. Mr. Justice Frankfurter applied
Section 20 of the Clayton Act, interpreted in the light of the definition of
"labor dispute" written into Section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and
found that the acts involved were not unlawful "in so far as 'any law of the
United States' is concerned, . . . including the Sherman Law." 28 In finding
that the acts involved were of a kind protected by Section 20 of the Clayton
Act, the Court asserted that, "So long as a union acts in its self-interest and
,does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under Section 20 (of the Clayton Act) are not to be distinguished by any judgment
regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are
the means."' 24 The concept involved in this statement became a factor of
controlling importance in the Allen Bradley Co. case of 1945, in which the
union did "combine with non-labor groups," and in which the issue was defined by Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Supreme Court, as being
"whether it is a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for labor unions
and their members, prompted by a desire to get and hold jobs for themselves
at good wages and under high working standards, to combine with employers
and with manufacturers of goods to restrain competition in, and to monopolize the marketing of, such goods.11125 Or stated a bit differently, "do labor
unions violate the Sherman Act when, in order to further their own interests
as wage earners, they aid and abet business men to do the precise things
which the act prohibits." 26
In sustaining the trial court's granting of an injunction in this case,
Mr. Justice Black said, "We think Congress never intended that unions
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 501.
312 U. S. 219, 61 Sup. Ct. 463 (1941).
312 U. S. 219, 236.
Id. at 232.
325 U. S. 797, 798.
Id. at 801.
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could, consistently with the Sherman Act, aid non-labor groups to create
business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services. ' ' 12,
It was emphasized that in this case the employers and the union entered
into bargaining agreements in which the employers agreed not to buy goods
manufactured by any companies which employed other than members of
Local No. 3. And while the Court recognized that such an agreement standing alone would not have been in violation of the Sherman Act, by virtue
of the provisions of Section 20 of the Clayton Act, it did not stand alone in
this case, but was asserted to be a single element in a "far larger program in
which contractors and manufacturers united with one another to monopolize all the business in New York City, to bar all other business men from
that area, and to charge the public prices above a competitive level."' 2 Then
while the Court recognized that the union acting alone might have been so
far successful in its efforts as to have brought about separate individual refusals by all of their employers to buy electrical equipment not made by
members of Local No. 3, and might have brought about an increase in the
price of the goods, still, said the Court, "so far as the union might have
achieved this result acting alone, it would have been the natural consequence
of labor union activities exempted by the Clayton Act from the coverage of
the Sherman Act (Citing the Apex Hosiery case). But when the unions participated with a combination of business men who had complete power to
eliminate all competition among themselves and to prevent all competition
from others, a situation was created not included within the exemptions of
1 29
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts."'
The Court found no indication of a purpose on the part of Congress to
immunize labor unions from application of the Sherman Act when they aid
and abet manufacturers and traders in violating the statute and concluded
that the lower court had properly decided that the union in this case had
violated the Act.
Then said Mr. Justice Black, "Our holding means that the same labor
union activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business
groups. This, it is urged, brings about a wholly undesirable result-one
which leaves labor unions free to engage in conduct which restrains trade.

127. Id. at 808.
128. Id. at 809.
129. Ibid.
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But the desirability of such an exemption of labor unions is a question for
the determination of Congress."130
Finally, said the opinion, in emphasizing the conclusion that the union
had properly been determined to have violated the Sherman Act, "We know
that Congress feared the concentrated power of business organizations to
dominate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw business monopolies. A
business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such
participation is a violation of the Act.""'One writer commenting on this case says, "Thus a successful campaign,
by a union that controls both the manufacturing and the installing electrical
workers in a great city, to build an unscalable tariff wall around that city,
is not illegal by reason of the union's war aims, but only because of its
32
choice of allies.'
The case of Hunt v. Crwmboch, decided the same day as the Allen
Bradley Co. case, involved the issue of "whether an organization of laboring
men violated the Sherman Act... by refusing to admit to membership petitioner's employees, and by refusing to sell their services to petitioner;
thereby making it impossible for petitioner profitably to continue in business.)133
Petitioner operated a freight and food products transportation business
and held a contract with the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. In the
course of a strike called by the union of the truckers and haulers in the employ of A & P in an attempt to enforce a closed shop contract, a union man
was killed and the union charged that the petitioner, who refused to unionize its business and attempted to operate during the strike, had been responsible for the killing. The bitterness between the two continued despite the
acquittal of the member of petitioner's firm who had been prosecuted for
the murder. The union succeeded in securing a closed shop contract with
A & P, refused to accept petitioner's employees as members of the union or
to allow its members to work for petitioner with the result that A & P canceled its contract with petitioner. The union was likewise successful in repeating this performance with another company that entered into a contract
for trucking with petitioner, with the final result that petitioner's business
130. Id. at 810.
131. Id.at811.
132. Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organied Labor, 1941-1945 (1945)
HARv. L. REv. 1018, 1051.
133. 325 U. S. 821, 822.
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was wholly destroyed. The elimination of petitioner's service did not affect
the interstate business of A & P or the other company except to necessitate
contracting with union truckers.
In holding that the Sherman Act had not been violated here, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a sharply divided Court of 5 to 4, distinguished the
Allen Bradley case by pointing out that "the only combination here... was
one of workers alone and what they refused to sell petitioner was their labor." 13 4 He pointed out that "Congress in the Sherman Act and the legislation which followed it manifested no purpose to make any kind of refusal to
accept personal employment a violation of the Anti-trust laws."'' "
Distinguishing the situation here from that involved in the Steele, Tinstall, and Wallace Corporationcases previously discussed, standing "for the
principle that a bargaining agent owes a duty not to discriminate unfairly
against any of the group it purports to represent," the Court said even if
the record should show such discrimination here, "Congress has indicated
no purpose to make a union's breach of duty to employees in a collective
bargaining group, an infraction of the Sherman Act."'30
Problems of a nature quite similar to those dealt with in the Allen
Bradley and Crumbock cases, though involving in an important way provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as controlling applicability of the Sherman Act, and disposed of in a way calculated to restrict very greatly the

application of the Allen Bradley doctrine, were presented to the Supreme
Court in 1947 in the case of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America v. United States."1 7 Here several defendants had been convicted

below, prior to the decisions by the Supreme Court in the Allen Bradley and
Crumbock cases, on charges of conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act by attempts to monopolize interstate commerce in millwork and patterned lumber in the San Francisco Bay area. The parties to the alleged conspiracy
were of two groups. Local manufacturers of and dealers in the lumber products in question and their incorporated trade associations and officers
thereof made up one group, while unincorporated trade unions and their offi-

cials or business agents made up the other. The alleged purpose and effect was
to prevent out-of-state manufacturers from shipping and selling these commodities in the San Francisco Bay area ..,California, to prevent dealers in
134. Id. at 824.
135. Id. at 824,825.
136. Id. at 826.
137. 67 Sup. Ct. 775 (1947).
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that area from handling such out-of-state products, and to raise the prices.
The mechanism by which this was to be effected was a contract setting up
a wage scale for members of the labor unions working on the products in
question, combined with a provision that "no material will be purchased
from, and no work will be done on any material or article that has had any
operation performed on same by saw mills, mills or cabinet shops, or their
distributors that do not conform to the rates of wage and working conditions
of this agreement."
This agreement as enforced to result in higher wages, higher prices and
profits, and the exclusion of manufacturers against whom directed from sharing in the Bay Area business, "to the price disadyantage of the consumer
and the unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce," was said to fall
within the general scope of the Allen Bradley doctrine, as a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but the more serious question involved had to
do with the application of Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and its
possible shield to prevent effective application of the Sherman Act.
Section 6 provides that "No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in
a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United
States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except
upon clear proof of actual participation in or actual authorization of, such
acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof."
The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for five members
of the Court, said the purpose and effect of this section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to "relieve organizations, whether of labor or capital, and
members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputation of
guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officers or
members of the organization without clear proof that the organization or
member, charged with responsibility for the offense, actually participated,
gave prior authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of
their perpetration. 18s
The reason for this enactment was said to be the previous holding in a
conspiracy under the Sherman Act that "both the unions and their members (were) liable for all overt acts of their co-conspirators 39 . .. whether
the members or the unions approved of the acts or not or whether or not
138. Id. at 780.
139. United States v. Railway Employees' Dept. of A.F.L., D.C. 283 Fed. 479,
492 (1922).
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the acts were offenses under the criminal law." And while since enactment of the Section participants in a conspiracy covered by it are "not
immunized from, responsibility for authorized acts in furtherance of such
a conspiracy, they are now protected against liability for unauthorized
illegal acts of other participants in the conspiracy 1 40
The term "authorization" as used in Section 6 was said to mean
something different from corporate criminal responsibility for acts of
officers and agents in the course or scope of employment, and to have the
effect of restricting "responsibility or liability in labor disputes of employer or employee associations, organizations or their members for unlawful acts of the officers or members of those assocations or organizations,
although such officers or members are acting within the scope of their
general authority . . . , to those associations, organizations or their officers
or members who actually participate in the unlawful acts, except upon
clear proof that the particular act charged, or acts generally of that type
and quality, had been expressly authorized, or necessarily followed from
a granted authority, by the association or non-participating member
sought to be charged or was subsequently ratified by such association,
organization or member after actual knowledge of its occurrence.'" 4 1
It was pointed out that instructions consistent with this interpretation had been requested in the case and refused, and such refusal was held
to have 'been reversible error, in much the same way that failure to give
a reasonable doubt instruction in a criminal case would be.
The Court said this did not mean that such an association or organization must have given explicit authority to its officers or agents in a labor
controversy to violate the Sherman Act or to give approval to such an
act done, and that it could not escape responsibility by standing orders
disavowing authority to make agreements in violation of such statute.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom concurred The Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Burton, dissented 142 very vigorously, asserting that
"to assure immunity to powerful unions collaborating with employers'
associations in disregard of the Sherman Law, was not the purpose of
Section 6" 4" of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as would be the effect of the
interpretation employed by the majority. This provision was directed, he
140.
141.
142.
143.

67 Sup. Ct. 775, 780.
Id. at 781.
Mr. Justice Jackson did not participate in the case.
67 Sup. Ct. 775, 787.
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asserted, against abuse by some of the federal courts in the misapplication
of the law of agency so that labor unions were held responsible for the conduct of individuals in whom was lodged no authority to wield the power of
the union. "By undue extension of the doctrine of conspiracy, whereby the
act of each conspirator is chargeable to all, unions were on occasion held responsible for isolated acts of individuals, believed in some instances to have
been agents provocateurs who held spurious membership in the union during a strike. Congress," his opinion ran, "merely aimed to curb such an
abusive application of the principle of agency. It did not mean to change
the whole legal basis of collective responsibility. By talking about 'actual
authorization', Congress merely meant to emphasize that persons for whose
acts a corporation or a union is to be held responsible should really be wield'
ing authority for such corporation or union. 144
The only thing that Congress was seeking to do, according to this dissenting opinion, was to put an end to this abuse of some courts by which "organizations were held responsible not for acts of agents who had authority
to act, but for every act committed by any member of the union merely because he was a member, or because he had some relation to the union although not authorized by virtue of his position to act for the union in what
he did ....
1932 was too late in the day for Congress not to have known
that unions, like other organizations, act only through officers, and that
unions do not, any more than do other organizations, explictly instruct their
officers to violate the Sherman Law. Neither by inadvertence nor on purpose
did Congress remove the legal liability of organizations for the conduct of
officials who, within the limits of their authority, wield the power of those
45
organizations.11
It was also emphasized, as admitted by the majority, that the provisions of Section 6 apply in the same manner to labor unions and to corporations in cases involving labor disputes, and that the present interpretation
of the majority, "practically speaking ... serves to immunize unions ... as
well as corporations involved in labor disputes, from Sherman Law liability."14
With the rather obvious lack of clarity in the majority opinion, this case
certainly has serious possibilities by way of restricting the practical applica148
tion of the Sherman Act under the doctrine of the Allen Bradley case. a
144.
145.
146.
146a.

Ibid.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 789.
See Section 2(13) of the 1947 Act.
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ACT

The Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934,147 providing that "any person who,
inconnection with ... trade or commerce . . .obtains or attempts to obtain, by use of or attempt to use or threat to use force, violence, or coercion,
the payment of money or other valuable consideration . . . , not including,
however, the payment of wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee . . ." shall be subject to the penalties of the Act, was denied application to a labor union in the case of United States v. Local 807 of Interna-

tional Brotherlrood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Stablemen and Helpers of
4
America.'
In a criminal proceeding seeking to apply this statute to the prosecution of Local 807 and several individual members of the Union, the defendants had forced operators of trucks hauling merchandise in interstate commerce into New York City to pay a sum amounting to union wages for a
full days work for each truck entering the city regardless of whether the
,operators accepted the services of union truck drivers within the city or not.
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Byrnes the Supreme Court held that as to
,drivers who actually proffered their services and were willing to work for
the operators the exemption for "bona-fide employees" would apply and
they were not guilty of violating the Anti-Racketeering statute, notwith-

standing the coercion used in securing the payment which they regarded as
necessary for the protection of the interests of the Union. This conclusion

-was thought to be required by the purpose of the statute based on a careful
,consideration of its legislative history. Mr. Justice Byrnes was careful to
point out that such activities were not beyond the reach of federal legisla-tion directed to it, or beyond the power of the state and local authorities to
punish acts of violence.48a
VII.

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE AND TRAINING

ACT

A problem that may be of less importance now than some months ago,

but which is still of some practical concern, has to do with the much-disputed
147.

18 U.S.C.A. 420a.

148. 315 U. S. 521, 62 Sup. Ct. 642 (1942).
148a. This Act was amended in 1946 directly as a result of the Supreme Court
decision in the Local 807 case, adding the following: "See. 2. Whoever in any way
or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, or the movement of any article
or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion, shall be guilty of a felony."
Definitions of the terms "robebry" and "extortion" were also included. See page
405 of U. S. Code Congres§ipnal Service, 79th Congress, Second Session, 1946.
Also see page 1360 for explanation.
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question of super-seniority under the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940 for veterans returning to jobs which they held before entering the
armed services of their country. The leading case on that is Fiskgold v.
Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corporation.49
The employee, Fishgold, whose rights were involved in this case was reemployed by the company at his former job after his return from the armed
service in full compliance with the provisions of the statute, and was given
the same seniority that he would have had if he had continued his employment without a break during the whole time he was away in the service of
his country.
A collective bargaining agreement between the company, Fishgold's
employer, and a union recognized as the exclusive collective bargaining
agent, contained a common type of seniority clause providing that, "Promotions and reclassifications and increases or decreases in the working forces
shall be based upon the length of service and ability to do the job. Whenever
between two or more men, ability is fairly equal, length of service shall be
the controlling factor."
As work at the company's shipyards decreased and it became necessary
to lay off employees, such lay-offs were made in accordance with this seniority clause and Fishgold was laid off for a period of nine days while nonveterans with greater seniority were continued on the job.
The decision to lay off Fishgold was based on an arbitrator's determination that the seniority clause required it and that as so interpreted the
seniority clause did not conflict with the provisions of the Selective Training
and Service Act, Section 8 (b) B, and (c), requiring reemployment in a
"position of like seniority, status, and pay .. .

,"

and further providing that

such returned veteran "shall not be discharged from such position without
cause within one year after such restoration." In a suit for a declaratory
judgment as to his rights, and for compensation for the days laid off, the
district court gave Fisbgold judgment for the nine days' pay, on the ground
that he had been laid off in violation of the statute. This holding was based
on absence of a clear showing that the non-veterans permitted to work had
greater seniority than Fishgold and not squarely on the super-seniority conception advanced by the ruling of the Director of Selective Service.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, construed
the provisions of the statute, especially that prohibiting "discharge" with149. 328 U. S. 275, 66 Sup. Ct. 1105 (1946).
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out cause within a year which Fishgold claimed protected him also from
"lay-off" for a like period, and came to the conclusion that Congress had no
purpose to destroy existing seniority. systems but rather to protect the returned veteran in his seniority rights the same as if there had been no break
in his employment. But, said the Court, "we would distort the language of
these provisions if we read it as granting the veteran an increase in seniority over what'he would have had if he had never entered the armed services.... Congress made the restoration as nearly a complete substitute for
the original job as possible. No step-up or gain in priority can be fairly implied. Congress protected the veteran against loss of ground or demotion on
his return. The provision for restoration without loss of seniority to his old
position or to a position of like seniority mean no more."110
In like manner the Court found that the guarantee that he shall not be
"discharged from such position" was not intended to provide "a gain or stepup in seniority. " 15%
The position to which the veteran is restored, said the Court, "is the
position which he left plus cumulated seniority." Continuing, the Court asserted, "Congress recognized . . . the existence of seniority systems and
seniority rights. It sought to preserve the veteran's rights under those systems and to protect him against loss under them by reason of his absence. . . What it undertook to do was to give the veteran protection
within the framework of the seniority system plus a guarantee against demotion or termination of the employment relationship without cause for a
year.11115
One of the principal arguments in the case for a different result was
based on an administrative interpretation by the Director of Selective Service to the effect that the Act required reinstatement of a veteran to "his
former position or one of like seniority, status, and pay even though such
reinstatement necessitates the discharge of a non-veteran with a greater
seniority," plus the fact that Congress had amended the Act in 1944 and
extended it in 1945, without change, and knowing of this administrative interpretation, therefore, Congress in effect gave approval to that interpretation and thus read it into the statute.
Two answers to this contention were supplied by the Court. One was
that such an interpretation is not consistent with either the wording or the
150. 328 U. S. 275, 285, 286.
151. Id. at 286.
152. Id. at 287, 288.
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history of the statute and so could not preclude the Court from placing its
own interpretation upon the provisions in question, and second, there was a
second and contrary administrative interpretation rendered by the National
War Labor Board in an adversary proceeding in a dispute case. 58 Aside
from the fact that an interpretation thus rendered by "administrative agencies entrusted with the responsibility of making inter partes decisions" are
reconized as being entitled to superior weight as compared with other types
of administrative determination, it is clear that Congress was faced at least
at the time of its 1945 extension, with conflicting administrative interpretations which would preclude the conclusion that Congress had preferred one
over the other.
There was no indication that any member of the Court disagreed with
this conclusion denying the super-seniority contended for, though Mr. Justice Black dissented on procedural grounds, holding that the appeal to the
Circuit Court of Appeals should have been dismissed "because the Union
was not a proper party to appeal."
Very recently the case of Trailnwbile Co. v. Whirl 1 4 raised the question whether the seniority rights which the Fishgold case determined were
protected to the veteran by Section 8 of the Selective Training and Service
Act were guaranteed merely for one year or indefinitely. The facts of the
case are clear to the extent that the Highland Body Manufacturing Company of which Whirls was a returned veteran employee was a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Trailmobile Company and that the two were consolidated
under the name and complete control of the latter as a single corporation.
When the employees of the smaller Highland Company were transferred to
the payroll of the larger Trailmobile Company a controversy arose as to
relative seniority. The former insisted on retaining seniority as of their
original hiring by Highland, the latter that such seniority with Trailmobile
should date from the consolidation. Both groups had been affiliated with
American Federation of Labor and the dispute submitted to national representatives of that organization was decided in favor of Highland. Thereupon
the more numerous original Trailmobile employees reorganized as a C.I.O.
affiliate, won an election and secured a closed shop contract as of July 1944
which provided for dating seniority rights of the former Highland employees
from the date of consolidation. Whirls had returned from the service in May
1943 and had been properly reinstated in his former job with seniority, which
153. Scovill Mfg. Co., 21 W.L.R. 200 (1944).
154. 67 Sup. Ct. 982 (1947).
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was not disturbed until this new contract went into effect fourteen months
later. Thus, so far as the Selective Training and Service Act was concerned,
if its guarantees applied for only one year as contended by the union and
the company, it could not control this case. Whirls and the Government
contended that the guarantees of the Act relating to seniority do not end
with the expiration of one year after reinstatement but apply so long as the
employment continues. There was some confusion relative to alleged discriminatory treatment involved in later transfers, and also as to whether
the closed shop provision went into effect in July 1944 or not until the second C.I.O. contract in 1945, but in any event, Whirls' job and rate of pay
based on seniority were not disturbed until September 1945, substantially
more than two years after his reemployment as a returned veteran. Suit was
brought by Whirls to enjoin a threatened decrease in pay and change in his
seniority status and to obtain reinstatement to his former position and to
his former seniority. As a subsequent transfer gave him a rate higher than
his original position, the sole issue dealt with was one of seniority.
The provision of the Selective Training and Service Act whose application is drawn in question is Section 8 (c) which reads as follows: "Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b) (requiring restoration to the former
position or to one of like seniority, status, and pay) shall be considered as
having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of active military service, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, . .. and shall not
be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such
restoration."" 5t
In an opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, speaking for seven members of
the Court, and denying the indefinite guarantee contended for, it was pointed
out that the contention of the Government would have the effect of freezing
the incidents of the employment indefinitely, so long as the employment
continues, while freezing the right to the job itself for only one year. This
was thought to be inconsistent with the language of the statute and with
the purpose of Congress, and also inconsistent with the doctrine of the Fishgold case which in effect amalgamated all of the employee's rights and protected them under the provision against discharge when it held that the
wording and purpose of the statute gave "security not only against complete
discharge, but also against demotion, for the statutory year. And demotion
155. 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, 308 (b) and (c).
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was held to mean impairment of 'other rights', including his restored statutory seniority for that year."' 5 6
The effect of the Government's contention, it was said, would be that
"The reemployed veteran.., not only would be restored to his job simply as
the FisLgold case required, 'so that he does not lose ground by reason of his
absence'.... He would gain advantages beyond the statutory year over such
non-veteran employees," while the purpose of Congress was merely to see
that the service men would return to civilian life "without prejudice because
of their service."1"1 7 The principle involved in the denial of the claimed superseniority rights in the Fisligold case was thought to require the denial of
the government's contention here.
The majority opinion negatived the existence of any indication of discrimination against Whirls as a veteran or otherwise, at least until after the
decision of the case by the Circuit Court of Appeals which was not properly
up for consideration, so found it unnecessary to pass upon the contention of
the company and the union that all protection afforded by the Act terminates with the end of the specified year. Accordingly it was decided merely
that so much of the protection of the act ends with the end of the year "as
would give the reemployed veteran a preferred standing over employees
not veterans having identical seniority rights as of the time of his restoration.
We expressly reserve decision upon whether the statutory security extends
beyond the one-year period to secure the reemployed veteran against impairment in any respect of equality with such a fellow worker."''8
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, concurred in by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, appears to be predicated upon an assumption that
Whirls was being discriminated against because of his veteran status, the
correctness of which assumption was negatived in the majority opinion, and
was hardly clearly borne out by the facts recited in the dissenting opinion.
Referring to the nature of the employee's rights and the extent of the
statutory protection as asserted by the FisLgold opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson
said, "where employees have no seniority rights, the guarantee of one year's
employment is their only right. But if a seniority system does exist, the
Congress gave the employee 'protection within the framework of the seniority system plus a guarantee against demotion or termination of the employ156. 67 Sup. Ct. 982, 990.
157. Id. at 990,991.
158. Id. at 992.
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This would seem to mean
ment relationship without cause for a year'."'"
that he gets merely such seniority rights as non-veteran employees with
initial employment dating from the same time have, no more and no less,
except for the one year limitation on discharge or demotion, and in no way
calls for application of this statute beyond the one-year period. The opinion
does not then say that those seniority rights, unlike the right to the job,
must necessarily last indefinitely, as contended for in the case, but rather
shifts its position to one of emphasizing that the action by which seniority
rights were taken away in this case was improper and inconsistent with the
principles asserted by the Court in such cases as the Steele"'" and Tisnstall'"'
cases discussed above holding acts by union representatives illegal by reason of discrimination.
If the action here was directed against Whirls by reason of his status
as a veteran, then the Court would need to decide the issue reserved by the
majority opinion and determine whether the Selective Training and Service
Act could properly be invoked for prottection after the expiration of the year.
However, if the discrimination was not based on veteran status, as appears to
be the case, but was merely otherwise of questionable justification, it seems
that the problem would not call for application of that statute but would
rather call for a determination of whether the alleged discrimination falls
within the doctrine of the Steele and Tunsdall cases protecting minority
groups against discriminatory treatment by the certified bargaining representative, or within the doctrine of Lewellyn v. Flemihg,162 also discussed
above, as a permissible destruction of individual seniority rights in the executioil of a contract for the whole group. There seems reason to believe that
the Steele and Tunstall doctrine may be the proper one to apply. While
those cases were decided under the Railway Labor Act, there seems to be
no reason to believe that the same principles are not equally applicable
under the National Labor Relations Act which is involved here.
As a matter of fact, even if discrimination had been based on veteran
status, it is not at all clear that the same doctrine may not properly be invoked for protection, entirely aside from the possible application of the Selective Training and Service Act.
159.
160.
(1944).
161.
210, 65
162.
(1946).

Id.at 995.
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 65 Sup. Ct. 226
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U. S.
Sup. Ct 235 (1944).
154 F. (2d) 211 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946), certiorari denied 67 Sup. Ct. 45
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VIII. THE FAIR LABOR STAN1 ARDS ACT
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, among other things, provides
for the payment of time and one half for overtime in excess of 40 hours per
week, and for the regulation of minimum wages to be paid by employers to
employees "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" (meaning interstate or foreign commerce) and provides that "an
employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods
if such employee was employed in producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in. any
process or occupation. necessary to the production thereof in any state."
The constitutional validity of the Act in its general provisions was fully
sustained in 1941 in United States v. Darby6 and Opp Cotton Mills v
6 4 but the extent of its
Administrator of Wage and Hour Division,1
coverage,
the scope and details of its application, and the extent of the reach of the
commerce power as thus applied has continued to give rise to much important litigation, and a large number of cases worthy of special note fall within
the period here under consideration but limitations of space preclude discussion of more than a few.
In Kirschbaur v.. Walling,lei firemen, elevator operators, watchmen
and other similar employees in buildings the occupants of which manufactured clothing principally for interstate markets were held to be properly
included within the scope of the Act and thus sufficiently related to interstate commerce to be brought within the regulatory power of Congress. The
Court asserted that "without light and heat and power" provided by the employees in question "the tenants could not engage, as they do, in the production of goods for interstate commerce. The maintenance of a safe, habitable building is indispensable to that activity." Further the Court asserted
that it was not essential that "employees must themselves participate in the
physical process of making the goods before they can be regarded as engaged
in their production," and concluded that the work of these employees "had
such a close and immediate tie with the process of production for commerce,
and was therefore so much an essential part of it, that the employees are to
be regarded as engaged in an occupation 'necessary to the production of
goods for commerce'," within the meaning of the Act of Congress. The Court
here emphasized that the provisions of the Act expressly make its applica163. 312 U. S. 100, 657, 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (1941).
164. 312 U. S. 126, 657, 61 Sup. Ct 524 (1941).
165. 316 U. S.517, 62 Sup. Ct 1116 (1942).
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tion dependent upon the character of the employee's activities and not on
whether the employer is engaged in interstate commerce. If there had been
any initial feeling that the wording "in any process or occupation necessary
to the production" of goods for commerce in bringing within the application
of the statute employees not actually producing or working on goods to be
shipped in interstate commerce was to be restricted to employees of business
enterprises actually engaged in the production of goods for shipment in interstate commerce, the Kirschbaum case made it clear that the Act was destined
to have a much broader application.
In like manner to the Kirschbaum case, similar maintenance employees
attached to a building, owned by the Borden Milk Company, seventeen of
the twenty-four stories and 58%of the rentable area of which building were
occupied by the Borden Company's executive and administrative employees
engaged in directing, controlling, and administering the whole enterprise of
the company, which consisted in manfacturing various milk products and
shipping them in interstate and foreign commerce, were held in the case of
Borden Co. v. BorelIa 06 " to come within the scope of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
For purposes of comparison it is interesting to note that the Court in

Xo East 4oth Street Bldg. v. Callus 1 7 denied application of the same statute
to the maintenance employees of an ordinary office building devoted to the
housing of the usual miscellany of offices, despite the fact that 42% of the
rentable area and 48% of the rented area was occupied by executive offices,
sales agencies, et cetera, of concerns engaged in interstate commerce. The
distinction from the Kirschbaum v. Walling and Borden cases was said to
lie in the difference between a building devoted to manufacture for commerce
or one owned by an interstate producer and predominantly occupied by its
offices, and an ordinary office building, a substantial portion of whose tenants chanced to be engaged in interstate commerce. "Running an office
building as an entirely independent enterprise," said the Court, "is too many
steps removed from the physical process of the production of goods."168
Other cases quite similar to Kirschbaum v. Walling and Borden Co. v.
Borrela are Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co.,80 holding that
166.
167.
491, 63
168.
169.

325
325
Sup.
325
327

U. S. 679, 65 Sup. Ct. 1223 (1945).
U. S. 578, 65 Sup. C. 1227 (1945).Cf. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S.
Ct 1248 (1943).
U. S.578, 583.
U. S. 173, 66 Sup. Ct 379 (1946).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol12/iss3/1

60

19471

LABOR
CASES:
1941-1947
SOME RECENT
Howard: Howard:
Recent Labor
Cases 1941-1947

employees of a company engaged in window cleaning, painting, and maintenance work in industrial plants for customers engaged in the production of
goods for interstate commerce, such services being necessary to the production
of the goods produced within those plants, are properly brought within the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling,"10 holding the same as to employees of a company engaged in repairing
and reconditioning electric motors for customers producing goods for interstate commerce. Worthy of notice also is Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v.
7
Hall,1
1 applying the Act to members of a rotary drilling crew employed by
an independent oil well drilling contractor, who had no interest in the oil
leases involved, and where the drilling went only to an agreed depth short
of the sand stratum containing the oil, since they were engaged in a "process or occupation necessary to the production" of oil for interstate commerce. So also in Overstreet v. North. Shore Corporation'72 as to employees
engaged in maintaining and operating a toll road and drawbridge over a
navigable waterway where both the road and bridge were used extensively
by persons and vehicles traveling in interstate commerce. In both of these
cases the statute is applied to acts somewhat further removed in point of
time from the actual work of production, though the line of causation may
properly be regarded as sufficiently direct.
Two other cases, Walton v. Southern Package Corp.l ' 3 and Armour and
Co. v. Wantock,"74 applied the Act to night watchmen and a private firefighting force, although the maintenance of the latter was not indispensable
to continued production.
A more recent case decided in 1946, D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi,"75 also
valuable for comparison on this point, held the Fair Labor Standards Act
applicable to service and maintenance employees of a building that was
tenanted largely by occupants who receive, work on, and return in interstate commerce goods belonging to non-occupants who subsequently in the
regular course of their business ship substantial portions of the occupant's
products to other states, which fact was reasonably anticipated by the occupants. Also this case involved an important problem as to compromise
of the matter of coverage of the Act. In fact the Court asserted that the
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

326 U. S. 657, 66 Sup. Ct. 413 (1946).
317 U. S. 88, 63 Sup. Ct. 125 (1942).
318 U. S. 125, 63 Sup. Ct 494 (1943).
320 U. S. 540, 64 Sup. Ct. 320 (1944).
323 U. S. 126, 65 Sup. Ct. 165 (1944).
328 U. S. 108, 66 Sup. Ct.925 (1946).
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most important issue in the case was "whether the Fair Labor Standards
Act precludes a bona fide settlement of a bona fide dispute over the coverage of the Act on a laim for overtime compensation and liquidated damages
where the employee receives the overtime compensation in full.' 7 0 Said
Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court, "we
think the purpose of the Act . . . to secure for the lowest paid segment of
the Nation's workers a subsistence wage, leads to the conclusion that neither
wages nor the damages for withholding them are capable of reduction by
compromise of controversies over coverage. Such a compromise thwarts the
public policy of minimum wages, promptly paid, embodied in the WageHour Act, by reducing the sum selected by Congress as proper compensation
for withholding wages.".7 The policy of the Act to prevent an employee
from waiving his claim to liquidated damages, as distinct from his claim to
the statutory wages, had already been asserted by the Court in the case of
Brooklyn Bank v. O'Nel 7a where the employer, some two years after the
employee left his service, gave to the employee a check for the amount of
overtime pay due under the statute and received in return a release signed
by the employee purpoting to waive all further claim under the statute to
recover liquidated damages. That case also denied the right of the employee
to recover interest on the amount due as wages and liquidated damages,
since Congress itself had seen fit to fix the sums recoverable for delay, and
to allow interest would have the effect of giving double compensation for
damages arising from delay in the payment of the basic minimum wages.
0
The case of Fitzgerald Construction Co. v. Pederseie-decided the same
day was to the same effect.
Since the Act is applicable to employees "engaged in commerce" as
well as to those producing goods for commerce, it sometimes becomes necessary to determine when commerce begins and ends. Thus in the case of
Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.8 0 the Court held that paper products
received at seven branch houses from interstate shipments where they were

176. 328 U. S. at 110.
177. Id. at 116.
178. 324 U. S. 697, 65 Sup. Ct. 895 (1945).
179. 324 U. S. 720, 65 Sup. Ct. 892 (1945).
The matter of compromise as here involved is now covered by Section 3 of
the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947 which permits compromise for any amount
not less than the minimum hourly wage of forty cents per hour required under
the Act for regular time, or one and one-half times the minimum for overtime, and
permits complete waiver of all claim to liquidated damages.
180. 317 U. S. 564, 63 Sup. Ct. 332 (1943).
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unloaded into the warehouses and checked and then delivered wholesale to
the customers for whom they had been ordered were in interstate commerce
throughout until delivered to the customers, although none of the deliveries
from these warehouses went across state lines, and that the employees working at these seven branch houses were properly subjected to the application
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
This situation is to be distinguished from that in the case of Higgins v.
Carr Brothers Co. 8 decided the same day, where Carr Brothers Company
conducted a wholesale fruit and grocery business at Portland, Maine, buying its merchandise from local and out of state producers, had it all delivered
to its warehouse and then sold and distributed it to local retailers. The interstate commerce was held to come to an end with delivery into the wholesaler's warehouse and Higgins, employed as a night shipper putting up orders
and loading trucks for delivery to local retail dealers or driving a truck making deliveries, was held not to be a proper subject for application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. The absence of prior sales was important in bringing
the interstate commerce to an end when the merchandise was delivered into
the wholesaler's warehouse, though that factor was not emphasized by the
Court, and the further fact that the dealer here was operating in competition with wholesalers doing an interstate business was regarded as wholly
immaterial since the Fair Labor Standards Act, unlike such federal legislation
as the National Labor Relations Act, does not apply to business "affecting
commerce."
Several cases have dealt with problems of employee status under the
Fair Labor Standards Act aside from the general questions of coverage dealt
with above. The issue of employee or independent contractor was raised in
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb 82 with respect to beef boners using the
premises and equipment of a slaughter house for the special boning job performed on the production line in close relationship to other slaughter house
activities and under close supervision of the slaughter house management.
The lower court, whose judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court, found
that the whole of the operations at the slaughter house constituted an integrated economic unit devoted primarily to the production of boneless beef,
that the boners work alongside admitted employees of the plant operator at
their tasks, and asserted that "the task of each is performed in its natural
181. 317 U. S. 572, 63 Sup. Ct 337 (1943).
182. 67 Sup. Ct. 1473 (1947). See Section 2(3) of the Labor. Management
Relations Act of 1947.
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order as a contribution to the accomplishment of a common objective."
Therefore, in spite of an arrangement made with a single individual by
which he was to assemble skilled boners to do the boning work and to be paid
by the hundredweight of boned beef and the individual boners were to share
equally in the boning money, the Supreme Court affirmed that the "underlying economic realities ... lead to the conclusion that the boners were...
employees" of the- slaughter-house operator rather than employees of an independent contractor.
Trainees who accepted an opportunity offered by a terminal company
to learn the duties of brakeman and who, by qualifying for the work and
being placed in a reserve pool from which the company could draw additional employees as needed, were retroactively paid $4.00 per week for the
training period, but were otherwise not compensated, were held by the Supreme Court in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.1 13 not to be employees
within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In so holding the
Court observed that "the Act's purpose as to wages was to insure that every
person whose employment contemplated compensation should not be compelled to sell his services for less than the prescribed minimum wage," but
broad as the definitions of "employ" and "employee" may be in the statute
"they cannot be interpreted so as to make a person whose work serves only
his own interest an employee of another person who gives him aid and
instruction."184
The problem of industrial home work in the embroideries industry as it
affects the administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the matter
of wage determination thereunder came in for consideration by the Supreme
Court in the case of Gemsco v. Walling18 in 1945. The finding by the Administrator that he could not otherwise enforce a minimum wage as to
homeworkers employed in the industry led the Court to sustain an order
entirely prohibiting such home work under the statutory authorization to
the Administrator to include in wage orders "such terms and conditions"
as he "finds necessary to carry out the purposes of such orders" and to "prevent circumvention or evasion." The majority of the Court felt that the
183.
183.
184.
(1947).
capacity
the Act,
185.

67 Sup. Ct. 639 (1947).
67 Sup. Ct. 639 (1947).
Id. at 641. Cf. Walling v. Nashville, C. and St. L. Ry., 67 Sup. Ct. 644
For a case dealing with operating engineers serving in a supervisory
as persons employed in an "executive capacity" and thus not subject to
see Walling v. General Industries Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 883 (1947).
324 U. S. 244, 65 Sup. Ct. 605 (1945).
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showing of necessity as a means of making the order effectively and practically operative was sufficient to justify the holding that the Administrator
had not exceeded his proper discretion in the issuance of such an order.
The problem of whether or not tips may be included as a part of wages
in the case of redcap employees of a railroad terminal company for purposes
ef meeting the minimum wage requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act
was before the Court in the case of Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.""
Five members of the court took the position that the arrangement entered
into between the Terminal Company and the redcaps (perhaps not too enthusiastically by the latter) by which all tips were to be accounted for and
credited to the company for purposes of meeting the statutory minimum
wage requirement, with the proviso that any excess above the wage minimum was to be retained by the redcaps, was not invalid. In so holding the
attitude seemed to be that by virtue of this arrangement the employer might
keep "all earnings arising from the business," tips included. Three justices
dissented on the ground that the statute imposes upon the employer the
duty of paying the minimum wage and that to divert the tips, which the
traveling public intend to give to the redcap, to the employer company is
not consistent with the purpose of the statute.
Space will not permit a detailed discussion in this limited survey of the
several cases which have dealt with the matter of determining what is to be
considered the "regular rate on the basis of which overtime is to be computed where employees are paid otherwise than on a straight hourly basis.
Suffice it to say here perhaps that cases like Overnight Motor Transportation
Co.. v. Missel,'17 making it clear that pay by the week is covered by the
statute, such pay to be reduced by some method of computation to hourly
rates, with such cases as United States v. Rosenwasser8 8 establishing the
applicability of the statute to piecework rates, and cases like Walling v.
Youngerman-Reynolds Co.189 and Walling v. Harnischfeger CorporationP° requiring incentive rates to be treated as part of the regular rate for purposes
of application of the statute, have become established parts of the judicial
development of the law. The case of Walling v. A. H. Belo Corporation,'.
9
decided at the same time as the Missel case introduced an element of con186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

315 U. S. 386, 62 Sup. Ct. 659 (1942).
316 U. S.572, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216 (1942).
323 U. S.360, 65 Sup. Ct. 295 (1945).
325 U. S. 419, 65 Sup. Ct 1242 (1945).
325 U. S. 427, 65 Sup. Ct. 1246 (1945).
316 U. S.624, 62 Sup. Ct. 1223 (1942).
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fusion by permitting use of the device of a guaranteed weekly wage applicable to work weeks of fluctuating length and the use in addition of a so-called
regular hourly rate, thus somewhat modifying the doctrine of the other
cases. The Belo case was made the basis of an attempt to set up an ingenius
split-day method of compensation with so-called regular and overtime rates
so calculated as to continue in effect the same compensation for overtime
work weeks which had been in effect before the statute, which was held violative of the statute by a unanimous Supreme Court in Walling v. Helmericl
and Payne.192 On the basis of this decision and those in the Youngerman.
Reynolds Hardwood Co. and Harnisckfeger Corporation cases there was
some suggestion that the doctrine of the Belo case had been repudiated, but
it was reaffirmed in 1947.
In the case of Walling v. HalliburtonOil Well Cementing Co.1 8 a weekly
guarantee pay plan similar to that involved in the Belo case was applied to
the business of cementing, testing and servicing oil wells which required the
keeping of a stabilized group of skilled and specially trained employees, but
the volume of work was so far inconstant that the employees worked a
variable number of hours from day to day and week to week, the latter
ranging from 30"to 100 hours. The plan called for the payment of a basic
hourly rate at or above the statutory minimum for the first 40 hours of any
work week and not less than 1/2 times such basic hourly rate for all time
over 40 hours in any work week with a guarantee that the employee should
receive not less than a specified amount for each week. This was sustained
as valid, in spite of the fact that the hourly rate was so related to the guaranteed flat amount that the employee became entitled to more than that
weekly guarantee only when he worked in excess of 84 hours per week.
While the Halliburton case thus reaffirms the Belo case, both are
distinguished and perhaps somewhat limited in 149 Madison Avenue Corporation v. Asselta.194 Prior to the period of time involved in the wage controversy in this case, the existing agreement between the parties called for the
payment of flat weekly wages for workweeks of specified lengths, in most
cases being $25.00 for 47 hours of weekly employment. No hourly rates were
specified and no attempt was made to provide time and one-half for hours
worked in excess of forty per week. The new contract drawn in question in
the case is an outgrowth of this plan as modified by a War Labor Board
192. 323 U. S. 37, 65 Sup. Ct. 11 (1944).
193. 67 Sup. Ct. 1056 (1947).
194. 67 Sup. Ct. 1178 (1947).
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determination, and called for a workweek of 54 hours for watchmen\ and 46
hours for other regular employees. Weekly wages were set to compensate
for the 54 and 46 hour workweeks which were stated to include both payments for regular hours and time and one-half for hours in excess of 40.
The formula for calculating the regular hourly rate in the case of employees
working more than 40 hours per week as most of them did called for dividing
their weekly earnings by the number of hours worked plus one-half the
number of hours worked in excess of 40. It was found that in actual practice
the formula was not followed literally. The number of hours actually worked
was largely disregarded and only the number of hours the employee was
scheduled to work and the weekly wage for such scheduled workweek entered
into the calculation of*the so-called regular rate. The result was found to
be that the plan in operation made no adequate provision for overtime
compensation until employees had worked a total of the 54 or 46 hours in
the scheduled workweeks. This was thought to be made additionally clear by
the methods employed for calculating the wage of part time employees and
those failing to work the whole of their scheduled workweeks, those whose
failure was due to "excusable" absences having their wage calculated differently from those whose absences were "not excusable."
The payment of "overtime" compensation for six hours in the case of
workers with "excusable" absences for non-overtime work was thought to
raise "strong doubt as to the integrity of the hourly rate upon which the
'overtime' compensation is calculated." The operation of the plan in this
respect was said to reveal "further evidence of an attempt to pay a pro-rata
share of the weekly wage for an hour's labor regardless of the number of
hours worked up to 46."195
The agreement also called for payment at the rate of one and threequarters times the formula rate for hours in excess of 46. This was found
to come very close to that which would have been received had he been paid
an hourly rate determined by lividing the weekly wage payment for the
schduled workweek by 46 with payment of time and one-half for hours
worked in excess of 46.19 And with the exception of the unexcused absence
situation, it was found that the operation of the plan for practical purposes
was the same as one calling for "employment on a straight time 46 hour

195. Id. at 1182.
196. Ibid.
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week with payment of time and one-half only for hours worked in excess
of 46."197

The Court concluded that the so-called "'hourly rate' derived from
the use of the contract formula was not the 'regular rate' of pay within the
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act", and distinguished the case from
the Belo and Halliburton cases, pointing out that those cases provided for
a guaranteed weekly wage with a stipulation of an hourly rate which could
properly be regarded as the regular rate. The Court was unanimous in
holding that the plan in this case did not satisfy the statutory requirements.
Certainly of more interest at the time of their decision, if not of more
practical importance, are the cases dealing with what constitutes work time
for purposes of applying statutory requirements as to compensation as involved in the portal-to-portal pay cases.
As early as 1939 the Wage and Hour Administrator ruled that work
time for which compensation may be due under the Fair Labor Standards
Act may include more than merely that time spent by an employee working
for the benefit of the employer for which compensation is customarily paid.
Subsequently other rulings indicated that certain waiting time, travel time,
or preparatory time should be included in work time.
In March of 1941 the Administrator ruled that travel time underground
for miners, exclusive of coal mining, constituted work time. This culminated
in the first of the so-called portal-to-portal cases, Tennessee Coal, Iron and
Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123.1"
Before entering upon that discussion, however, mention should be made
of two other cases involving waiting time. In the case of Armour & Co. v.
Wantock,0 9 previously discussed for a different point, and Skidnwre v.
Swift and Co., 200 both decided the same day in late 1944, involving private
firefighting forces in packing plants and soap factories, the Court held that
waiting time of these employees subject to call may be treated as work
-time for purposes of regular and overtime compensation, dependent upon
the particular circumstances of each case, and the fact that much of such
time may be spent in playing cards and other amusements will not be
controlling. Employment in a stand-by capacity in "readiness to serve may
be hired quite as much as actual service. . 201 If the time is spent pre197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 1183.
321 U. S. 590,
323 U. S. 126,
323 U. S. 134,
323 U. S. 126,

64 Sup. Ct 698 (1944).
65 Sup. Ct. 165 (1944).
65 Sup. Ct. 161 (1944).
133.
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dominantly for the employer's benefit, rather than the employee's benefit
that may be the determining factor.
In the first of the strictly portal-to-portal cases, the Tennessee Coal and
Iron case, travel underground from mine portal to the face of the ore where
the actual work is done, found by the trial court to bear "ina substantial
degree every indicia of worktime: supervision by the employer, physical
anda mental exertion, activity necessary to be performed for the employer's
benefit, and conditions peculiar to the occupation of mining,"2 °2 was held
by Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for seven members of the Court, to constitute work time within the meaning of the statute. In so holding he emphasized at some length the long "rides in the dark, moist, maladorous shafts
from 3000 to 12000 feet" with low ceilings and overhead dangers, where
"broken ribs, injured arms and legs, and bloody heads often result (and)
even fatalities are not unknown."203 "The exacting and dangerous conditions
in the mine shafts," said Mr. Justice Murphy, "stand as mute, unanswerable
proof that the journey from and to the portal involves continuous physical
and mental exertion as well as hazards to life and limb." All of which
"compulsory travel occurs entirely on (the employers') property and is at
all times under their strict control and supervision." Such "travel time is
spent for the benefit of the... (employers) and their iron ore mining operations. . . . Such hazardous travel is thus essential to 'the employers' pro.duction'.11204 "Iron ore miners travelling underground are . . . engaged in a
'process or occupation' necessary to actual production"205 within the meaning
of the statute.
The Court found the contracts for a 54 hour work week "at the isual
working place" not controlling, partly on the ground that there had been
no bona fide collective bargaining preceding such contracts and partly on
the ground that a contract excluding such time like one excluding any other
work time would be contrary to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
This latter aspect of the case became the chief point of controversy
between the majority and minority of the Supreme Court Justices when
they divided 5 to 4 in the second portal-to-portal case, Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America.200 There was
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

321 U. S. 590, 593.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 598, .599.
Id. at 599.
325 U. S.161, 65 Sup. Ct. 1063 (1945).
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involved the bituminous coal mining industry the labor relations in which
had been controlled for many years by collective bargaining contracts
between the operators and the United Mine Workers, and by which contracts
the parties fairly clearly had restricted work time to a "face to face" basis,
thus having the effect of excluding any direct allowance for travel time.
There was some suggestion that the wage scale provided for by the contracts
was intended to compensate indirectly for travel time.
Two issues were involved, (1) whether the travel time properly constituted work time within the meaning of the statute, and (2) whether the
contracts involved prevented application of the statute.
As to the first the majority of the Court, again speaking through Mr.
Justice Murphy, found "no substantial factual or legal difference between
this and the Tennessee Coal (and Iron) case and that underground travel in
bituminous coal mines as well as in iron ore mines is included within the
compensable workweek contemplated by Section 7 (a) of the Fair Labor
' 207
Standards Act.
"Factually," said the Court, "underground travel between the portals
and working faces of the petitioner's two bituminous coal mines bears all
the indicia of work. While the District Court here found 'no such painful
and burdensome conditions as those described in the iron ore mines' .
all three of the essential elements of work as set forth in the Tennessee Coal
case are present....
"(1) Physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not),'' °s
involving underground journeys in small empty coal cars varying from one
to five miles and fraught with certain hardships, plus 500 to 1500 foot
journeys on foot through dark and dangerous tunnels carrying rather heavy
equipment.
"(2) Exertion controlled or required by the employer

. . .

the under-

ground travel is both controlled and required by petitioner [employer] .11211
"(3) Exertion pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the
employer and his business." 210
Thus the first question was fully controlled by the Tennessee Coal and
Iron case.
As to the second issue the employer rested its case on the conclusion of
207. 325 U. S. 161, 163.

208. Ibid.
209. Id. at 165.
210. Ibid.
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the district court that "'by the universal custom and usage of the past
fifty years, and by agreement of the parties in every collective bargaining
agreement which was ever made, it was universally recognized that in the
bituminous coal industry, travel time was not work time' (53 F. Supp. at
950). "211
Quoting from the Tennessee Coal anid Iron case, the Court said,
"itis immaterial that there may have been a prior custom or contract not
to consider certain work within the compass of the workweek or not to
compensate employees for certain portions of their work. The Fair Labor
Standards Act was not designed to codify or perpetuate those customs and
contracts which allow an employer to claim all of an employee's time while
compensating him for only a part of it. Congress intended, instead, to achieve
a uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work or
employment engaged in by employees covered by the Act. Any custom or
contract falling short of that basic policy, like an agreement to pay less
than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be utilized to deprive employees of their statutory rights.1'212 Neither are employees "to be deprived
of the benefits of the Act simply because they are well paid or because they
are represented by strong bargaining agents.'
Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion left open the question of "validity of
agreements whereby, in a bona fide attempt to avoid complex difficulties
of computation, travel time is averaged or fixed at an arbitrary figure and
underground miners are paid on that basis rather than according to their
'21 4
individual travel time.
Four members of the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson, dissented very vigorously from that part of the majority opinion which denied
the efficacy of the contract between the parties to prevent the application
of the statute. In thus dissenting the Supreme Court minority most strongly
emphasized among other things that the majority ruling (1) "either invalidates or ignores the explicit terms of collectively bargained agreements
between these parties based on a half century of custom in the industry,' 121 5
and
"(2) Neither invalidation nor disregard of collectively bargained agreements is authorized by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Both its legislative
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 166.
Id. at 167.
Ibid.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.
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history and contemporaneous legislation are convincing that Congress did
not itself intend to nullify them or to provide any legislative basis for this
Court to do so.11216
Finally, said Mr. Justice Jackson, "It is hard to see how the long range
interests of labor itself are advanced by a holding that there is no mode by
which it may bind itself to any specified future conduct, however fairly
bargained. 217
The third case in this series and the one that has received the most
218
publicity is that of Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.
Space will not permit going into detail on this case, but questions were
raised as to both walking time on the employer's premises after punching
in on the time clock and certain alleged preliminary activities identified as
"putting on aprons and overalls, removing shirts, taping and greasing arms,
putting on finger cots, preparing the equipment for productive work, turning on switches for lights and machinery, opening windows and assembling
and sharpening tools. 219
As to these latter matters the master had denied recovery solely because
the amount of time so spent had not been proved by the employees with
any degrees of reliability or accuracy. This case is of importance for the
handling of this matter by the Court, taking the position that the employee
does not keep records, but rather the employer, and hence only the latter
is in a position to make accurate proof. The circuit court of appeals had held
that the burden rested upon the employees to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that they did not receive the wages to which they were entitled.
This, said the Supreme Court, "imposed upon the employees an improper
standard of proof" 220 which would penalize them "by denying him (them)
any recovery on the ground that he is (they are) unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work."2 2 . Unless the employer can provide
accurate estimates, it is the duty of the trier of the facts to draw whatever
reasonable inferences can be drawn from the employees' evidence as to the
amount of time spent in these activities in excess of the productive working
time.
The Court applied the doctrine of the Tennessee Coal and Iron and the
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 175.
Id. at 195.
328 U. S. 680, 66 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1946).
328 U. S.680, 692, 693.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 687.
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Jewell Ridge Coal Co. cases to hold that "time (necessarily) spent in walking
to work on the employer's premises after the time clocks were punched,
involved 'physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not)' controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily
for the benefit of the employer and his business." 222 In like manner the same
principles were held to apply to time spent in the so-called preliminary
activities, and the case was sent back to the lower court for the purpose
of determining the amount of time involved in both activities.
In doing this Mr. Justice Murphy emphasized no less than four
times that the doctrine of de mininims was not to be overlooked.
Said he, "we do not, of course preclude the application of a de minimis
rule where the minimum walking time is such as to be negligible.... It is
only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of
his time and effort that compensable working time is involved. The de
mt'nimis rule can doubtless be applied to much of the walking time involved
in this case, but the precise scope of that application can be determined
only after the trier of the facts makes more definite findings as to the
amount of walking time in issue.1' 223 Also, he said, "it is appropriate to
apply a de minimis doctrine so that insubstantial and insignificant periods
of time spent in preliminary activities need not be included in the statutory
2 24
work week."
On that basis, then, the case went back to the district court for Judge
Picard to determine whether and how much compensable time was involved.
It was only after the Supreme Court denied a requested rehearing in
the Mt. Clemens case, and after the Dow Chemical Company settlement
based on the principles of these cases and involving a very substantial
monetary sum that a large number of suits were instituted for back pay
based on these cases, and that the most acute public interest developed
in the matter, with industry urgently demanding that Congress amend the
Fair Labor Standards Act to take away the right to recover back pay for
such time. If the decision of the district court on its reconsideration of
the Mt. Clemens case was to be regarded as indicative of what would
happen in a large percentage of those cases, as appeared likely, the much
heralded danger to industrial financial stability was more apparent than
222. Id. at 691, 692.
223. Id. at 692.
224. Id. at 693.
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real. It appeared obvious from the outset that many, if not most, of the
cases flied would not result in recovery, at least of any substantial amounts,
due regard being paid to the de minimis rule.
In applying the de minimis rule to this case and denying that any
compensation was due for either walking time or preliminary activities,
the district court 22 5 emphasized that it was walking time bearing no relation to the convenience and necessity of the employee but that "pursued
necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business"
that was held to be compensable by the Supreme Court. Then reasoned the
district court, "it is elementary . . . that one on his way to his own
lunch in a cafeteria . . . is walking there for his own 'convenience and
necessity' and not 'necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer
"2
and his business'. 20
In construing the Supreme Court opinion the district court found an
intimation that twelve minutes or anything in excess thereof per day should
not be considered de minimis, and concluded that clearly everything below
12 minutes should be so considered. Also it interpreted the Supreme Court
opinion as restricting walking time to be regarded as compensable to that
consumed in going to work and not that involved in returning from work.
On that basis it found that the maximum walking time attributable to any
employee was not in excess of 6.2 minutes per day, while the so-called
preliminary activities were found to occupy less than 3 minutes per day,
or a grand total of between 8 and 9 minutes per day, all properly to be
disregarded for purposes of compensation under the de minimis rule.
One further observation by the district court is worthy of special notice
and that is its holding that if it has misinterpreted the Supreme Court as
to what walking time is compensable and walking from as well as to work is
to be included, and also to and from lunch, so that it would amount to
over 12 minutes and not be de minimis, then, in fairness to the employer
here concerned who had followed all wage and hour regulations or rulings
available which appeared to indicate that anything less than 20 or 25
minutes could properly be disregarded, only prospective application should
be made, and not retroactively so as to cast upon industry an unexpected
and unfair burden.
225. Anderson vs. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 69 F. Supp. 710. (D.C.E.D.
Mich. 1947)
226. Id. at 719.
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With the subsequent dismissal of the appeal from the district court's
decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 227 on motion of the parties,
and a like dismissal on motion of petitioners, attorneys for the Justice
228
Department, of the petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court,
this long drawn-out Mt. Clemens litigation reached its final termination.
The later enactment of the Portal-to-Pay Act of 1947229 brought an end,
temporarily at least, to the interest in this whole problem involved in the
many portal-to-portal pay suits. That this Act also made other farreaching changes in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is a matter not
appropriate for the present discussion.

227. LRR, 1947 WH 1185, 1220; 15 LW 2579.
228. United States v. Mt Clemens Pottery Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1191 (1947).
229. Public Law 49, 80th Congress, Chapter 52, 1st Session, approved May 14,
1947.
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